UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/21972
30 November 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/21950 and Corr.1),

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1991;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

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best copy available

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21973
29 November 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The attached note verbale, dated 26 November 1990, was addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations.

Annex

Note verbale dated 26 November 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Note SCPC/7/90(3-1) of 2 November 1990, requesting information regarding the application of the provisions of Security Council resolution 661 (1990).

The Holy See is pleased to inform the Secretary-General that, in accordance with its particular character, it does not have any type of commercial, financial or economic activities with Iraq. The activities over which the Holy See has some control in Iraq are purely of a spiritual, religious and educational nature.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21974
30 November 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At its 2964th meeting, on 30 November 1990, following the adoption of resolution 679 (1990), the President of the Security Council made the following statement:

"In connection with the resolution just adopted on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, I have been authorized to make the following complementary statement on behalf of the Security Council:

'As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 1/ states, in paragraph 23: "Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached." That statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council.'"

1/ S/21950 and Corr.1.

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READEX FICHE

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21975
30 November 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 28 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Further to our letters concerning the systematic destruction in Kuwait of all aspects of economic activity being carried out by the Iraqi occupation authorities in an attempt to destroy the independent economic existence of the State, I should like to inform you that all amenities in the agricultural sector, a sector for the promotion and development of which Kuwait has made strenuous efforts in severe climatological and environmental conditions, have been subjected to such widespread destruction that losses have amounted to more than a billion dollars.

These enormous losses embrace agricultural development, aesthetic landscaping, animal husbandry and fisheries, inasmuch as the inhuman Iraqi régime harbours resentment not only against mankind but against life itself, the environment, plants and animals. Plantations have been ruined and plundered; parks and fish production plants have been destroyed; cattle, sheep and horses have been stolen; and poultry farms and fishing boats have been seized.

All thoroughbred Arab horses, at least 2,000 head, have been removed from stud farms and from the riding club and transported to Baghdad, as have at least 20,000 head of cattle. The contents of the zoological garden, including all of its rare animals, have likewise been removed. Parks, of which there are more than 100 in Kuwait, have been transformed into military camps, bringing about the destruction of water pipes and plants.

Some 862 plantations of an area of approximately 434 hectares and some 6,944 hectares of field crops, one half located in the north close to the Kuwait-Iraq borders and the other in the south close to the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia borders, have been threatened with complete destruction. The output of these areas is close to 50,000 tons of vegetables a year, and it meets about 19 per cent of Kuwait's domestic consumption requirements. Moreover, because of destruction and neglect, 200 kilometres of avenues and 66 kilometres of highway borders with plantings, as well as forestry projects covering an area of 4,000 hectares, have been ruined.

The Iraqi forces have seized all of the more than 1,000 fishing boats and have wrecked research vessels equipped with scientific instruments for the study of marine life, in which connection it should be noted that fish production in Kuwait had risen to some 11,000 tons a year.

At the same time, foodstuffs have begun to run out, so that the Kuwaiti people is being subjected to a process of intimidation the like of which is unknown in previous history. Kuwaitis who refuse to acquire Iraqi identity documents are unable to obtain food or fuel, thereby increasing the suffering of Kuwaiti citizens under an Iraqi colonialist policy of starving them out with the goal of forcing them to leave their homeland.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21976
3 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose the text of a statement by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria on Security Council resolution 678 (1990). I would very much appreciate it if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dimitar KOSTOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Annex

Statement by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria on Security Council resolution 678 (1990)

Bulgaria welcomes the ever more active participation of the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council in resolving crisis situations and in maintaining world peace and security.

We would like to express our full support for the resolutions of the Security Council directed at bringing an end to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the restoration of the latter's sovereignty and legitimate Government. Bulgaria is abiding strictly by the comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on Iraq, guided by the understanding that the strict implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council is of key importance for the successful functioning of the system for maintaining international peace and security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

We offer our unconditional support to the efforts of the Security Council aimed at resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf. It is our view that all options for a political settlement should be explored. We hope that the Iraqi leadership will show political wisdom in observing the fundamental norms and principles of international law and the clearly expressed view of the international community and will undertake the necessary actions to implement Security Council resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990) and 678 (1990) within the specified time-frame. At the same time, should diplomatic efforts fail to bring about an unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, Bulgaria will support all further actions based on the respective Security Council resolutions directed at attaining these goals. We shall continue to fulfil all our obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21977
3 December 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of an interview given by Mr. Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyasah on 21 November 1990.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Amre MOUSSA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Al-Siyasah: When are the war-drums going to beat? Or when is war going to break out?

President: In fact, the drums are beating now, and the consequences are bad. Unfortunately, in Iraq, they do not understand how bad they are; it seems they are completely cut off from what is going on in the world. We have done all we can to stop this destructive war occurring; we have clung on to the faintest glimmer of hope that those in Baghdad would wake up and spare the world from a catastrophe. But so far everything has led to a blind alley.

Al-Siyasah: Mr. President, has the glimmer of hope disappeared? Do you think peaceful solutions have been exhausted? Why have you asked for two or three months' delay?

President: I asked for two or three months just in case ... as a last attempt. I am more a military man than a civilian, so I know how much destruction this war is going to cause. I asked for two or three months, but I don't know if the world, damaged as it is by this crisis, is going to grant my request. Nor do I know whether, in those two or three months, we shall simply be knocking, or trying to knock on every door, without anyone paying attention.

President Mubarak made the following comments on the subject of King Hassan II's call for an Arab summit:

President: When this Moroccan proposal was first made, we thought it was based on arrangements which would ensure its success at the international level, or that Morocco had received intimations that the Iraqis were prepared to show some flexibility. However, as soon as the proposal was announced, Iraq declared its own crippling conditions and we saw that we were going back to the same vicious circle, the same blind alley. That is why the Moroccan proposal ended the way it did, without being accepted by the Arab States, which wanted a specific agenda limited to fixing a deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and implementing the resolutions of the Security Council and the Council of the League of Arab States. Once it had decided to implement the United Nations resolutions, the world would not allow Iraq to buy time.

Al-Siyasah: Will the international community's united front in respect of Kuwait disintegrate if Saddam Hussein manages to play for - or buy - time?

President: Not at a time like this ... not in a case like this ... not with such a degree of global solidarity and international co-ordination. It is not a matter of minor borders being disputed which can be left to regional arrangements. The fact is that Saddam Hussein has occupied an independent country which has its place on the map of the world. If the world lets Saddam get away with it, we shall have a dangerous international situation in which the big can swallow the small and the strong can tear the weak to pieces: this cannot be allowed to happen. The international community's determination to punish Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait

will not disintegrate. Iraq is wrong if it thinks that it can buy time in order to play on the world's emotions.

Al-Siyasah: But, Mr. President, what is the secret of Saddam Hussein's strength and stubbornness with the world lined up against him? Is he militarily strong? Or are his aides demons rather than human beings?

President: Saddam Hussein's crisis is that he fails to understand the extent of this international crisis. He has a number of advisers who paint an entirely unrealistic picture for him; they tell him that the war will be lost by the international forces. Saddam Hussein's strength is not external, it is just his power over the Iraqi people themselves, who face intimidation, killing and many ordeals. If this war happens, it will not last as long as Saddam Hussein imagines. Also, his army has now begun to feel that it is going into an unequal battle. If the war happens, most will save their own skins rather than fight, both because they know they are going into an unequal battle and because it will be a dishonourable war, occupying a country which is not theirs and dispossessing another people. Saddam's army understands this now. Up to the last moment, we were doing our best to prevent the Iraqi leadership from dragging its people, its army and all its resources to destruction, affecting other States in turn.

Al-Siyasah: How do you view the initiatives which the Iraqi President proposes from time to time, including the latest one in which he said he would release the hostages over a period of three months from Christmas?

President: Saddam Hussein thinks that he is dealing with fools or simpletons. America has given him its reply; Thatcher has given him her reply; they have made it clear that the point of his initiative is to buy time. He thinks they are unaware of his objectives. This is part of his fatal mistake. Obviously, he is not accustomed to dealing with international politics. He does not understand it; he thinks that any country in the world is an Iraqi village: if it refuses, he threatens it with the binary chemical weapons which he thinks he is going to be able to use if war breaks out.

Al-Siyasah: Mr. President, while following the Gulf crisis, I learned that one Arab leader, when bidding farewell on his departure from Cairo, told you that Saddam Hussein had acquired $100 billion and asked whether $20 billion would be enough for you or whether you wanted more.

The President was silent for a moment and then spoke with feeling.

President: I do not need to point out that Egypt will not be bought at any price. It is true that we are undergoing economic difficulties, but we shall not sell our principles or squander the ideals which we have inherited from generation to generation. These principles are not confined only to the political leadership of Egypt; they have been among the features of our people thoughout history. That is why I say that Egypt's principles and positions will not be sold, whatever the price.

Al-Siyasah: Mr. President, an American Congressman said that Saddam Hussein had offered you $25 million.

President: Yes, before he went into Kuwait, our central bank received the sum of $25 million, which I was told had been remitted by President Saddam Hussein. The amount surprised me, considering that Iraq was going through a crisis and was, as they say, in need. When I spoke to him about this sum, the Iraqi President told me, that very same day, that this was only a beginning and that they would send me more soon, when things became easier. I wanted to return the money, but we made use of it to meet our needs - by that, of course, I mean the needs of the Egyptian Government - after being told that the money could not be returned because the gesture would be misinterpreted. So Saddam Hussein thought that our principles were up for sale.

Al-Siyasah: Are you aware, Mr. President, that your principled behaviour has brought you recognition, in the eyes of the countries and peoples of the Gulf, as a historic leader who has proved that Egypt remains the mother and corner-stone of the Arab world?

President: We have applied our principles in the Gulf crisis. How can we allow one State to swallow up another? This is a political deluge which we cannot allow to happen to an independent Arab State. We would adopt the same position of principle if it was a question of a foreign State acting in this way towards another foreign State. Our standards would be affected if we allowed this act to pass. We have applied our principles, and they are principles of which we are proud. Egypt has a long history and is not a pirate State.

Al-Siyasah: What lies behind the attitude of those States which have supported Saddam and tried to justify and endorse his action?

President: As time passes, many things will be revealed. One day we shall be shown things which we could not have imagined. Among those responsible for what happened to Kuwait are instigators from outside Iraq who were impelled by their need for money and thought that they would divide the spoils. The facts will be revealed and, when the time comes, I too shall have much to say.

Al-Siyasah: What were Saddam Hussein's calculations when he went into Kuwait? What was he betting on?

President: Saddam thought that an operation of this sort would go just like some other crises. He thought that the world would protest a little, but that things would go as he wanted, that he would play for time and then remain in Kuwait for ever, helped by some of those who thought they were able to prepare the international stage for him. His calculations were mistaken. Since taking power, he has plunged Iraq into many crises and problems: his calculations on the war with Iran were wrong; now we have his calculations with respect to Kuwait, which have proved to be wrong; since taking power, Saddam's calculations have always been wrong. I think he believes that battles and crises are conducted in the media. It is unfortunate that some of those around President Saddam give him an unrealistically rosy impression of many things.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21978
3 December 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PANAMA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you documentation concerning the transfer of crude oil from the Iraqi tanker Almustransiriyah to the Panamanian-registered vessel Miramar on the high seas roughly 250 nautical miles off the coast of Cuba.

The Government of Panama has reported this activity of the vessel Miramar to the competent authorities so that they may take steps to ensure that Security Council resolution 661 (1990), which Panama supports, may be strictly observed.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) César PEREIRA BURGOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Spanish]

Letter dated 31 October 1990 from the Director of the Consular and Legalizations Department concerning Security Council resolution 661 (1990) addressed to the Director-General of International Organizations and Conferences

I am sending you herewith, for your information and appropriate action, note No. 176 from the Embassy of the United States concerning the transfer of crude oil from an Iraqi tanker to a Panamanian vessel.

The Department of the Navy (Secnaves) has been informed of the above so that it may take steps to avoid a repetition of these events.

(Signed) Benjamín OREJUELA
Director of the Consular and
Legalizations Department

Enclosure

[Original: English]

Note dated 19 October 1990 from the Embassy of the United States of America in Panama addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Panama

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Panama and wishes to inform the Ministry that the Panamanian registered vessel Miramar, owned by Seiriki, Panama, is currently taking on Iraqi crude oil from the Iraqi vessel Almustansiriyah on the high seas, roughly 250 nautical miles off the coast of Cuba (position 2220N08700W).

The crude oil being transferred from the Iraqi vessel to the Miramar was exported prior to the imposition of United Nations sanctions. Therefore, acceptance of the crude oil does not contravene Security Council resolution 661 (1990). However, payment or other form of recompense for the oil after 6 August would violate the terms established in paragraph 4 of resolution 661 (1990), repeated here for your convenience:

> "All States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public-utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait ...".

In view of the provisions of this resolution, the Embassy requests that the Government of the Republic of Panama make every effort to assure that the Panamanian registered ship Miramar does not accept crude oil from the Iraqi vessel Almustansiriyah unless it can be determined that the transaction would not result in financial resources being transferred, either directly or indirectly, to Iraq in violation of the sanctions cited above.

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/45/826
S/21979
4 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Agenda item 153
IRAQI AGGRESSION AND THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 30 November 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement issued on 30 November 1990 by the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Government of Japan on the adoption of Security Council resolution 678 (1990) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 153, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yoshio HATANO
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
Japan to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement issued on 30 November 1990 by the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Government of Japan on the adoption of Security Council resolution 678 (1990)

1. The Government of Japan welcomes the adoption on 29 November 1990 by the Security Council of the United Nations of resolution 678 (1990). Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, appreciates the efforts made so far by the Security Council for a solution of the Gulf crisis in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and supports this resolution as a means of strengthening the said efforts.

Security Council resolution 678 (1990) is based on the view that the implementation of the Council resolutions that demand that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces from Kuwait is of fundamental importance for the maintenance of the order of the international community. Council resolution 678 (1990) is also extremely important as it authorizes the countries concerned to use all necessary measures to implement Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, if they are not complied with by 15 January 1991.

2. Japan maintains the steadfast hope that the crisis will be settled peacefully. Japan strongly demands once again that Iraq, taking this resolution as its final opportunity, comply with its obligations to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions promptly, withdraw from Kuwait and release all the foreign nationals immediately and unconditionally, so that it will not be confronted with a still more serious situation.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21980
4 December 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Pursuant to our letters concerning the inhuman practices of the Iraqi occupation authorities against Kuwaiti citizens, we have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of an article by James LeMoyne published in The New York Times of 2 December 1990. The article includes testimony given by Kuwaitis who were forced to leave the country in the last few days.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Permanent Representative

Annex

New Kuwaiti refugees tell of Iraqi killings and rapes
By James LeMoyne
The New York Times
Sunday, 2 December 1990

[Original: English]

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Dec. 1 - New refugees arriving here today after fleeing Kuwait have offered emotional accounts of continuing Iraqi killings, rapes, torture and forced evacuation of civilians.

The victims include a 12-year-old girl who was sexually attacked by an Iraqi soldier two weeks ago, according to a detailed account provided by a Kuwaiti doctor who said she had tended the abused child.

More than 300,000 Kuwaitis, nearly half the population, are now estimated to have fled into Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti and Saudi officials say. Most first come to hotels here in Dhahran, where those interviewed were found.

Taken together, their reports offer a vivid picture of an occupied country veering between emotional destitution and determined resistance to Iraqi annexation.

"I REFUSE TO BECOME IRAQI"

"I can't imagine giving up my Kuwait nationality for anything," declared the doctor, who fled across the border to this town this week. "I left in part because I refuse to become Iraqi."

Then, in clinical terms that seemed chosen to permit her to keep control of her emotions, the doctor precisely detailed the rape by Iraqi soldiers of six different women whose injuries she said she had tended.

"The incidence of rape is now increasing in a pattern that seems to be repeated, like a contagious disease," she said. "Iraqi soldiers enter a home, tie up the men, rob the valuables and then rape the women."

"Most of the women I saw were molested and then sodomized," the doctor said. "When I saw them, they were in a state of stock, still denying what had happened to them."

NAMES WITHHELD IN FEAR

Like all of the recent refugees interviewed, the doctor would not give her name, because she said she still had 12 relatives in Kuwait and feared Iraqi retribution against them. Her accounts were highly detailed, and she showed a Kuwaiti Medical Association card identifying her as a physician.

She would not give the names of the rape victims she had tended, but did provide their ages, the dates of the attacks and the locations.

The doctor said the 12-year-old girl had been attacked by an Iraqi soldier who was one of a group that entered her home in the suburb of Bayan in Kuwait City two weeks ago.

The girl said the soldier had abused her in front of her father and mother, the doctor said, adding that the girl's mother had told of bribing the soldier with $3,000 to stop him from raping her daughter.

The doctor said she had also tended two sisters who had been abused by Iraqi soldiers who entered their home two weeks ago in the Kuwait City suburb of Rumathia.

INJURIES ARE DETAILED

One sister, 19, had scratches on her breast, a bite on her neck and bruising, the doctor said. The other sister, 22, was so severely sodomized that her anus was torn, the doctor said. She said the woman's attacker was named Adnan, a tall Iraqi soldier with light brown hair.

"The girls were still in shock, but their mother cried and told me, 'I wish they had killed me instead of doing this to my girls.'"

The doctor said the head nurse at the main military hospital in Kuwait City was raped at the beginning of the occupation by an Iraqi officer who was outraged when the nurse told him she would keep working in the hospital "because she felt it was her duty as a Kuwaiti."

"He took her to a room and raped her for an hour," the doctor said. "Many doctors and nurses at the hospital are witnesses to this."

MEDICINE IS SCARCE

The doctor also detailed a growing shortage of medicines, worsened by the Iraqi confiscation of the main medical warehouse in the suburb of Sabham three weeks ago.

"We were only seeing emergency cases," the doctor said. "We have so few resources that we have to turn the rest away."

One of those who says he suffered as a consequence is a Kuwaiti refugee who gave his name as Abdul Nabib, 45. A double amputee, confined to a wheelchair, he says he fled Kuwait two weeks ago in a car with relatives.

Mr. Nabib said that when the Iraqis invaded, he was lying in a hospital bed recovering from an operation to amputate his feet that had become infected as a consequence of diabetes.

"The Iraqi soldiers came into my hospital room and took my artificial limbs," he said, speaking through a translator. "I told them I needed them for walking, but they didn't pay me any attention."

HIS SON WAS TAKEN AWAY

Mr. Nabib added that Iraqi soldiers took away his 25-year-old son a month and a half ago and that he has not been seen since. He refused to give his son's name.

"Many families have suffered this," Mr. Nabib said. "I will have to endure it just as they endure it."

A 45-year-old Kuwaiti exile who gave his name only as Mohammed said Iraqi soldiers shot a 19-year-old boy, Sadia Ali Jassim, in the head in front of his mother, after accusing him of helping the resistance. The killing occurred on Sept. 26 in the suburb of Khaldia of Kuwait City, he said.

Mohammed's 17-year-old son, who was a friend of the slain boy, said he carried the body wrapped in a white sheet to a graveyard. The 17-year-old son refused to give his name because he has family who could be identified by the Iraqis, he said.

"When we carried Sadia's body to the grave, the blood ran from the wounded head and stained my cheeks red," the boy said.

He added that two other boys executed by the Iraqis were being buried the same day.

EXECUTION OF DOCTOR REPORTED

The Kuwaiti woman doctor said the Iraqis had also executed Dr. Hisham Obaidan, shooting him in front of his wife and three children at the end of October after accusing him of tending to wounded members of the resistance.

A 12-year-old Kuwaiti boy named Mohammed, who fled two weeks ago, said he saw another 12-year-old boy who had been tortured with cigarette burns by Iraqi soldiers as punishment for painting anti-Iraqi graffiti on walls. The 45-year-old refugee, also named Mohammed, said he saw the same boy.

"He had burns on his left wrist and his legs," the 12-year-old said of the tortured boy he says he saw two weeks ago in the Sabah Al Salem area of Kuwait City.

"I don't think we can ever forgive the Iraqis," Mohammed said, "What they have done is unforgivable."

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21981
7 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 June-30 November 1990)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June 1990 to 30 November 1990 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 657 (1990) of 15 June 1990, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 30 November 1990.

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 657 (1990). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire (see S/14275, para. 7, and footnote 37).

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1990:

	Military personnel		
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	12	
	Infantry battalion	388	
	Military Police Company	10	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	Le 12e Régiment blindé du Canada	538	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military Police Company	11	575

	Military personnel		
Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 54	323	
	Military Police Company	13	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military Police Company	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military Police Company	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military Police Company	3	
	HQ SWEDCIVPOL	1	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force Scout Car Squadron, C Squadron, 13/18 Hussars	107	
	22 AD Regiment, Royal Artillery	320	
	HQ UNFICYP Support Regiment (Engineers, signals, army aviation flight transport, medical centre, ordnance workshops)	284	
	Military Police	9	745
			2 094
	Civilian Police		
Australia		20	
Sweden		18	38
			2 132

4. In November 1990, I decided to send a review team to Cyprus to examine, in close co-operation with my Special Representative and the Force Commander, the organization and operations of UNFICYP. In particular, it was asked to consider the continued relevance of the functions entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council in resolution 164 (1964) and subsequent resolutions, to consider possible changes in the Force's method of operations, such as the use of military observers, and to consider the possibility of reducing the Force's strength and making other economies. The team was in Cyprus from 11 to 21 November 1990. Its report is being issued for the information of the members of the Security Council in document S/21982.

5. UNFICYP suffered six fatal casualties, five due to traffic accidents and one due to other reasons, bringing the total of casualties to 158 since the inception of the Force in 1964.

6. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major-General Clive Milner.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

7. UNFICYP maintained liaison and co-operation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1983 (see document S/15812, para. 14) continued to be applied. Despite considerable efforts with all concerned, it has not been possible for UNFICYP to increase its freedom of movement in the northern part of the island.

8. During the period under review, UNFICYP vehicles were on a number of occasions delayed when entering the United Nations buffer zone. UNFICYP patrols were interfered with by troops of both sides in areas of the buffer zone where they do not frequently operate. For example, on 14 June, two UNFICYP soldiers were detained by Turkish forces while conducting a routine investigation. On 19 October 1990, a United Nations patrol conducting an investigation into a cease-fire violation was stopped in the buffer zone by the National Guard. Such incidents strained relations with both sides and UNFICYP protested these incidents, reiterating its right to access and activity in all parts of the buffer zone.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

9. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

10. UNFICYP kept the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 148 observation posts, 52 of which are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols were also employed especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices were used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

11. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations buffer zone and is essential to the ability of the Force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise farming in the buffer zone, resupply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British Engineers maintain these tracks in a workable condition but with considerable effort and difficulty.

12. During the period under review, UNFICYP initiated a mine-clearing project that will cover certain parts of the buffer zone where members of UNFICYP as well as civilians are at risk. The detailed reconnaissance by Canadian Engineers of all known minefields within the buffer zone has been completed, and their report is due shortly.

13. During this period, the number of cease-fire violations increased slightly. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions at Nicosia continued to hold. However, in some parts of Nicosia and its suburbs, the troops of both sides remain in dangerous proximity to each other. This is a matter of considerable concern, and UNFICYP is continuing its efforts to extend the agreement to other areas in and adjacent to Nicosia, although it is experiencing difficulties at the present time in achieving this objective.

14. There were 23 overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by Turkish forces aircraft and 12 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were 11 overflights from the north and 16 from the south by civilian aircraft. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for a further nine overflights.

15. As stated in my previous report (S/21340, para. 14) tension rose on the island following the arrest of five young Greek Cypriots by the Turkish Cypriot Police in February 1990 after they crossed the cease-fire lines (the last two were released from detention during the current reporting period). Following these incidents, the Ledra Palace crossing point was closed to tourists by the Greek Cypriot side and the Turkish Cypriot side suspended all meetings between Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace. This has hampered still further the very limited contacts between the two sides.

16. The National Guard's construction programme to improve their defensive positions all along its cease-fire line was a contentious issue and increased tension throughout the period under review. The Turkish forces made strong representations to UNFICYP demanding that the work be stopped. They considered many of the positions to be new, provocative and a change to the status quo. UNFICYP itself expressed reservations about some of the construction and complained about the unwillingness of the National Guard to discuss the issue or advise UNFICYP beforehand of upcoming work. This programme is continuing and the National Guard continues to state that all the works are in its area of control and in no way violate the status quo.

17. On 19 July 1990, the Government of Turkey transferred the responsibility for the security of the fenced area of Varosha to the Turkish Cypriot security forces. This change caused an increase in political tension. It is appropriate to recall my report to the Security Council of 29 May 1987, in which I stated that "I have reiterated on several occasions to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities that

the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha" (S/18880, para. 28). UNFICYP continues to maintain this position.

18. Near Kokkina and Famagusta, violations continued of the seaward extension of the buffer zone known as the "maritime security line", established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security purposes (S/17657, para. 19). On 19 June 1990, the Turkish forces fired warning shots at Greek Cypriot fishing boats in the area of Kokkina. UNFICYP continues to report each crossing of the line to the authorities concerned and warns both sides of the dangers involved and of the need to show restraint.

19. During the period under review, a number of demonstrations and rallies took place on the Greek Cypriot side, the majority of which were centered at Nicosia. For the most part they were peaceful and orderly and well policed by the Cypriot Police (CYPOL), which continued to take action to prevent entrance into the buffer zone. As a result there was little confrontation with UNFICYP.

20. On 24 September 1990, as a result of the Turkish forces continuing to use a track in the buffer zone north of Selemani, UNFICYP established a standing patrol in the area. The Turkish forces reacted by removing the United Nations barrels and signs, replacing them with their own and posting sentries on the track. The National Guard protested strongly about this incursion into the buffer zone. Following negotiations with both sides, UNFICYP re-established the status quo and at present maintains a standing patrol in the area.

21. Both sides again conveyed to me their concern about the strength of the military forces on the other side. In this connection, I wish to recall my reports of 2 December 1986 (S/18491, para. 22) and of 29 May 1987 (S/18880, paras. 21-23). I remain very concerned about the strength and development of the military forces on both sides. This situation raises the level of tension and increases the possible risks of serious incidents.

22. The Government of Cyprus has again complained to the United Nations about reported destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage located in the northern part of the island. Desecration of the churches of Ayios Philon at Rizokarpaso, of Saint Theresa near Yialousa, of Saint Irene at Ayia Eirini, of Saint Barbara at Vatyli, of the church of Davlos village, looting of the churches of the Archangel Michael and of Saint George at Patriki, the demolition of the church of Panayia Avghasida near the village of Aloa and extensive damage of the mosaic pavements of the Basilica of Soli were listed in the representation by the Government of Cyprus. On my instruction, UNFICYP has raised these matters with the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

23. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP has facilitated economic and other civilian activities in the areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. In particular, UNFICYP continued to encourage

farming and also facilitated commercial beekeeping in the buffer zone. In an area of the buffer zone north of Mammari Village, the Turkish forces have attempted to prevent Greek Cypriots from farming north of the Ovgos riverbed. This is contrary to an agreement reached between the Turkish forces and UNFICYP in October 1988, under which farming activity in the buffer zone is permitted up to 400 metres from the Turkish forces cease-fire line. UNFICYP continues to apply the provisions of this agreement.

24. UNFICYP has continued to assist both communities on matters related to the supply of electricity and water from one part of the island to the other. Following a very dry winter, the island experienced severe water shortages during the summer. Nicosia was subjected to water rationing for considerable periods, and UNFICYP was particularly active in maintaining liaison and mutual trust between both sides. The most worrying aspect for the future is the suspected penetration of sea water in a number of boreholes in the Morphou aquifer in the north-west of the island. This aquifer provides water for both the northern and the southern parts of Nicosia. To date, however, UNFICYP has been unable to gain access to the aquifer to carry out an independent assessment.

25. During this period, the Turkish Cypriot authorities began work on the preparation of a site for the construction of a dam on the Xeros river north of the buffer zone. The dam will trap water from the Xeros river which flows from the Greek Cypriot side. It is intended that this water will be used for irrigation purposes in the Lefka area and that any excess water will be directed to Morphou to recharge the aquifer there. The Greek Cypriot authorities have indicated that they have completed a feasibility study concerning the building of a dam upstream on the same river on the southern side of the buffer zone. Should these projects proceed in their present form, the possibility of serious problems between the two sides could arise.

26. The 1990 anti-mosquito programme in the buffer zone continued under UNFICYP supervision. The current programme is scheduled to be completed on 20 December 1990.

27. The number of Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is now 597, of whom 593 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 4 in Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to discharge humanitarian functions for these Greek Cypriots and delivered 403 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross. UNFICYP continued to carry out arrangements for the delivery of mail and Red Cross messages across the cease-fire lines. It also delivered social welfare and pension benefits to Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus. UNFICYP personnel continued to interview, in private, Greek Cypriots who applied for permanent transfer to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Three such transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated temporary visits by Greek Cypriots to the southern part of the island, 571 of which took place during the reporting period. The Greek Cypriot primary school in Rizokarpaso now has 28 pupils and the one in Ayia Trias now has 10. In August, 15 Greek Cypriot school children, who were spending school holidays with their parents in the Karpas area, were forced by the Turkish Cypriot Police to leave their homes and go south.

This was contrary to previous practice whereby such school children were allowed to spend up to 30 days on summer holidays with their parents in the Karpas. Following a week of negotiations between UNFICYP and the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the children were allowed to return.

28. In line with the Vienna III agreement concerning the support provided by UNFICYP to the Greek Cypriot population living in the northern part of the island, the Liaison Post at Leonarisso was reopened in May 1990 and manned by SWEDCIVPOL in conjunction with AUSCON personnel. The Turkish Cypriot authorities, however, objected to the presence of SWEDCIVPOL in the Karpas and also insisted that they should not accompany the resupply convoys to the area. In October 1990 one member of AUSCON was detained by the Turkish Cypriot Police after leaving the Liaison Post to respond to a complaint by a Greek Cypriot woman living in the Karpas that several members of the Turkish Cypriot Police had entered and searched her home. UNFICYP is pursuing its efforts to carry out its responsibilities in that area.

29. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. It also helped them to maintain contact with their relatives in the northern part and arranged 20 family reunions involving 130 persons at the Ledra Palace Hotel. UNFICYP enjoys freedom of movement for these visits in the southern part of the island except for the Limassol area where the Cypriot Police insists on accompanying all UNFICYP patrols. UNFICYP continued to distribute pension benefits to Turkish Cypriots living in the northern part of the island who were formerly employed by the Government of Cyprus.

30. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island is now 261. UNFICYP continued to assist in arranging frequent contact between Maronites living on the two sides of the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP also delivered to them 126 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government.

31. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation, to civilian members of both communities. When the need arose UNFICYP escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the southern part of the island and regularly delivered medicines to Turkish Cypriots in the north.

32. UNFICYP continued its efforts to foster relations in the mixed village of Pyla situated in the buffer zone. The Greek Cypriot Police control point outside the buffer zone, has severely disrupted the economic life of the village, giving rise to discontent among its population. In addition, the allocation, by the Greek Cypriot authorities, of Government land in the village for building purposes to Greek Cypriots only is a cause of considerable resentment among the Turkish Cypriots. UNFICYP continues to monitor this issue and to work towards an acceptable solution.

33. The project to refurbish Roccas Bastion and Paphos Gate, two very sensitive posts of the Venetian city walls at Nicosia, was started on 20 August 1990. Greek Cypriot workers cleaned half of Roccas Bastion and Turkish Cypriot workers completed the cleaning of the other half. The co-operation between the authorities of both sides and UNFICYP on this project was exemplary. The willingness of the workers to carry out the project together was particularly noteworthy and shows what can be done if there is the necessary will.

34. The United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) maintained close co-operation and liaison with the Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot Police on matters having intercommunal aspects. In conjunction with UNFICYP line units, they contributed to the maintenance of law and order and assisted in investigations, in the control of civilians in the buffer zone and in humanitarian activities.

35. UNFICYP co-operated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in particular to facilitate projects involving both communities. UNHCR supported such projects concerning sewerage, medical care and rehabilitation of the handicapped. UNDP continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued projects with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) for the control of newborn animal diseases, with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for the development of handicrafts and with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the prevention and control of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

36. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons held five sessions, comprising 19 meetings of which 10 were attended by the three members and their assistants and 9 which were attended by the three members alone. The Committee continued its discussions on reports by both sides and its investigation in the field on the cases that have been submitted to it so far. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons also considered the submission by both sides of all cases of missing persons.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

37. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP, for the period of six months beyond 15 December 1990, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at $15.4 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(Thousands of United States dollars)

I. Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
Movement of contingents	290
Operational expenses	1 720
Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	746
Rations	965
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel	3 229
Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
Total I	7 200

II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents

Pay, allowances and transport	7 400
Contingent-owned equipment	700
Death and disability	100
Total II	8 200
Grand total (I and II)	15 400

The projected increase in the costs to the United Nations is mainly the result of projected exchange rate fluctuations.

38. The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e. regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

39. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force that is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, as at 30 November 1990, only $4.1 million have been received, against anticipated expenditures of some $13.8 million for the mandate period that is about to end. On average, the contributions received per mandate period approximate to 59 per cent of the costs of the Force to the United Nations. As a result, the reimbursement of claims from the troop-contributing countries has been made only up to December 1980. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be $171.6 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

40. I informed the Security Council about developments relating to my mission of good offices in my report of 7 November 1990 (S/21932). On 9 November 1990, the President of the Council issued a statement on behalf of its members in which the members of the Council, inter alia, request me to report by 15 February 1991 on the outcome of my effort to arrive at an agreed outline of an overall agreement and to provide the Council with my assessment of the situation at that time (S/21934).

VII. OBSERVATIONS

41. During the past six months, UNFICYP continued to perform its important functions in an exemplary manner, often under difficult circumstances.

42. In the light of the prevailing circumstances, I have no doubt that the continued presence of the Force in the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend to the Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned, and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

43. In making this recommendation, I must again stress that UNFICYP is facing a chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis, which imposes a most unfair burden on the troop-contributing countries. I fully share their Governments' concern at this situation. As I have suggested on a number of occasions, the best way to finance UNFICYP on a more equitable basis would be for the United Nations share of the costs of the Force to be financed from assessed contributions.

44. As reported in paragraph 4 above, in November I dispatched a Secretariat review team to examine the operations and organization of UNFICYP. The team concluded (see S/21982) that (a) the current functions of UNFICYP remain valid; (b) the status quo and the prevention of a recurrence of fighting are not self-sustaining and therefore the continued deployment of UNFICYP all along the buffer zone remains necessary; (c) the number of on-line troops cannot be further reduced without impairing the effectiveness of the Force; and (d) the cost-cutting measures carried out over the past 10 years have exhausted most possibilities for further reductions. The team considered the possibility of converting UNFICYP wholly or in part into an observer mission, but concluded that the prevailing situation on the ground did not make this a viable option. Because of the lack of agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides on the complete delineation of the cease-fire lines, as recorded by UNFICYP, and the lack of agreement on the use and control of the buffer zone, UNFICYP must retain both a reactive and a preventive capability. The team also examined the possibility of reducing the number of infantry battalions from four to three without reducing the current level of on-line personnel. The team concluded that this would be feasible and that it would permit a better ratio of line troops to support troops, resulting in an overall reduction of some 200, all ranks. The team underlined that continued reliance on voluntary contributions to finance the portion of the costs for which the United Nations is responsible would jeopardize the future of UNFICYP. It also expressed the view that the changed organization that it recommended could be implemented only if the method of financing was changed to assessed contributions.

45. The team's findings and recommendations seem to me to be sound, and I intend to discuss their implementation with the Governments that contribute troops to UNFICYP.

46. I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have continued to give this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Governments that have contributed towards the financing of the Force.

47. In concluding, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilión, to the Force Commander, Major General Clive Milner, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود مقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округов
Limite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场，简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aeroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром; взлетно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
HQ BRITCON
HQ CANCON
Force Scout Car Sqn (-)
UN HP Coy (-)
UNFICYP Support Regt
Engineer Det
Signal Sqn
Army Air Corps Flight
Transport Sqn
Ordnance Det
Reme Workshop
Medical Centre
Canadian Logistic Coy
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Coy (-)
One Coy
HQ SECTOR 1 (DANCON)
HQ & SP Coy
One Engr Sect
One Coy
One Engr Tp
One Coy
Two Recce Sects
One Ferret Tp
One Coy (-)
MP Det
One Pl
SECTOR 1
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 3
SECTOR 4
HQ SECTOR 4 (AUSCON)
HQ Coy
One Pl
Ferret Tp
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Coy (-)
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One Coy
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
One Coy (-)
Ferret Tp
One Pl
HQ SECTOR 3 (CANCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
Recce Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
UNCIVPOL Stn
NICOSIA
LIMASSOL
LARNACA
FAMAGUSTA
PAPHOS
KYRENIA
AKROTIRI S.B.A
DHEKELIA S.B.A
C. Andreas
C. Arnauti
C. Gata
C. Greco
C. Pyla
Morphou Bay
Khrysokhou Bay
Episkopi Bay
Akrotiri Bay
Famagusta Bay
انتشار قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في تشرين الثاني / نوفمبر ١٩٩٠
一九九〇年十一月联塞部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF NOVEMBER 1990
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1990
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА НОЯБРЬ 1990
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN NOVIEMBRE DE 1990
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Lineas de cesacion del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Lineas de cesacion del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لحماية السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'operations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 June 1990-30 November 1990)

Addendum

In my report of 7 December 1990 (S/21981, para. 42), I recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months, and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on the matter. I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension. The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot side, which is that the text of the draft resolution contained in document S/22000 is unacceptable as a basis for extending the stationing of UNFICYP, but that its stand will be expounded at the meeting of the Security Council.

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S/21982
7 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT REVIEW TEAM ON THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

Note by the Secretary-General

As mentioned in paragraph 4 of my report of 7 December 1990 to the Security Council (S/21981), I dispatched a secretariat review team to Cyprus in November 1990 to review the operations of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Its report is submitted herewith to the Security Council for its information.

Annex

Report of the Secretariat Review Team

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INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to a decision by the Secretary-General, a Secretariat team was sent to Cyprus in November 1990 to undertake, in close co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander, a review of the organization and operations of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The Team was led by Mr. Gustave Feissel, Director in the Offices of the Secretary-General, and included Lieutenant Colonel Dermot Earley, Deputy Military Adviser to the Secretary-General; Mr. James Baldie, Chief, Logistics and Communications Section, Field Operations Division; Ms. Mignon Williams, Associate Accountant, Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance; and Mr. Shashi Tharoor, First Officer, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs (Secretary). The Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Marrack Goulding, accompanied the Team at the beginning of its mission to launch its work.

2. The Team was requested to review all aspects of UNFICYP's organization and operations. It was in particular to consider the continued relevance of the functions entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council in resolution 164 (1964) and subsequent resolutions, to consider possible changes in UNFICYP's method of operations, such as the use of military observers, and to consider the possibility of reducing the Force's strength and making other economies.

3. The Team first met in New York in early November and was in Cyprus from 11 to 21 November 1990. Preparatory work carried out by UNFICYP and by relevant units at Headquarters included a description of the detailed organizational arrangements of UNFICYP; an examination of military, international civilian and local staffing trends over the last five years; the cost and financing of UNFICYP since 1980; the extra and extraordinary costs claimed by troop-contributing Governments over the past 10 years; and a survey of incidents along the buffer zone over the past 5 years. In addition, the Team consulted the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on UNFICYP and on his mission of good offices in Cyprus. The Team also reviewed the report of the 1980 Survey Team a/ which had covered similar ground and which served as the point of departure for its own endeavours.

4. At the outset of its stay in Cyprus, the Team benefited from a thorough briefing from and extensive discussions with the Force Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General Clive Milner, and his senior staff. The Team then visited the battalion and company headquarters in each of the four sectors for extensive briefings and discussions with the sector commanders and their senior staff. The Team travelled the entire length of the buffer zone, visiting selected observation posts and sensitive areas. The Team also met with the senior staff of the Support Regiment and the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). Consultations were held with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Oscar Camilion. Finally, a "brainstorming" session was held with the Force Commander and his senior headquarters and sector staff. The Review Team wishes to record its appreciation for the invaluable co-operation and assistance that was extended to it throughout its stay in Cyprus and for the open-minded and constructive spirit in which members of UNFICYP approached the review.

5. Section I of the present report is devoted to an examination of the functions of UNFICYP as mandated by the Security Council and the conditions under which these functions have to be carried out. The current situation is compared with that of 1980, when the last review was undertaken, and the current strength and organization of UNFICYP are examined in the light of its functions and the prevailing conditions. In the following section, the Team focuses on the cost and financing of UNFICYP. Specifically it examines the cost to the troop-contributing Governments and to the United Nations, it describes the efforts made in past years at cost-cutting and, finally, it assesses the current situation. In the final section, the Team makes an overall evaluation and puts forward recommendations.

I. FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

6. The mandate of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 657 (1990). Following the events that occurred on 15 July 1974 and thereafter, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire. a/

7. The functions of UNFICYP in pursuance of its mandate are twofold:

(a) Maintenance of the military status quo and prevention of a recurrence of fighting;

(b) Humanitarian and economic activities to promote a return to normal conditions.

A. Maintenance of the status quo

8. Since August 1974, UNFICYP has been deployed between the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces. This area, known as the buffer zone, extends across the island for some 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos in the north-west to the Dherinia area in the south-east. The area between the two lines varies in width from 7 kilometres to only a few metres.

9. The functions of UNFICYP are based on the requirements of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in 1974. In keeping with these requirements, it

is the position of the United Nations that the National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces are required to remain behind their respective cease-fire lines and that neither can exercise authority or jurisdiction beyond its line.

10. The following are considered by UNFICYP to be the main categories of cease-fire violations:

(a) Any move of military elements forward of their cease-fire line into the buffer zone;

(b) The discnarge of any type of weapons or explosives, without prior notification, along the cease-fire lines or up to a distance of 1,000 metres behind them;

(c) Building of new or strengthening of existing military positions within 400 m of the opposing cease-fire line;

(d) Building of new or strengthening of existing military positions more than 400 m from the opposing cease-fire line if UNFICYP considers this incompatible with the spirit of the cease-fire;

(e) Overflights of the buffer zone by military or civilian aircraft of either side;

(f) Troop deployment and training exercises in an area closer than 1,000 m from their cease-fire line without prior notification;

(g) Provocative acts between the two sides, such as shouting abuse, indecent gestures or throwing stones.

11. Strict adherence to the status quo in the buffer zone and along both cease-fire lines is a vital element in preventing a recurrence of fighting. UNFICYP seeks to maintain the status quo by permanent monitoring of the cease-fire lines and the buffer zone and by swift reaction to any violation. In order to fulfil this objective, UNFICYP maintains constant surveillance through 148 observation posts, 52 of which are manned on a 24 hour basis and the others of which are visited daily; carries out continuous air, vehicle and foot patrols; maintains surveillance of the seaward extension of the cease-fire lines; investigates and acts upon violations of the cease-fire and ensures that the status quo is restored; defuses cases of tension, especially through the prompt deployment of troops; and maintains constant liaison and communications with all command levels of the military forces on both sides. UNFICYP also monitors the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha, which has a special status.

12. A key element in considering the functions and role of UNFICYP is the fact that there is no formal agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides on the complete delineation of the buffer zone as recorded by UNFICYP, nor on the use and control of the buffer zone. As a result, UNFICYP finds itself supervising, by loose mutual consent, two constantly disputed cease-fire lines. The parties continue to this day in their attempts to establish their version of the cease-fire line through

persistent movements forward and encroachments into the buffer zone. In the prevailing climate of distrust, even minor moves on one side may be interpreted as a provocation and may prompt a reaction by the other. UNFICYP troops deployed along the buffer zone have to be fully familiar with every detail of the existing arrangements, maintain constant observation and be prepared to react should any step be taken which could be construed as a violation of the military status quo. They have to remain on constant alert for any attempt by either side to improve its military position along its cease-fire line by moving forward or any other measure that would alter the status quo, such as the strengthening of existing positions or the installation of new ones.

13. Because of this situation, UNFICYP is confronted with hundreds of incidents each year (820 during the first 10 months of 1990). Nearly 25 per cent of these were shootings, including deliberate warning shots. About 20 per cent involved encroachments into the buffer zone, and another 20 per cent the strengthening of positions near the cease-fire line. When such violations are observed, they are immediately dealt with at the local level. UNFICYP's reaction depends on the nature of the violation and may include investigation, the deployment of troops, verbal and written protests and follow-up action to ensure that the violation has been rectified or will not recur. An essential element in preventing serious escalations is to maintain constant liaison at all levels with the forces on both sides. UNFICYP's policy is to try to solve matters at the lowest possible level, thereby isolating and defusing small incidents before they acquire more serious military or political dimensions.

14. The task of UNFICYP is further complicated in areas where the cease-fire lines are in close proximity to each other, particularly in Nicosia and its suburbs. Tense situations often occur in places where the buffer zone is only a few metres wide and opposing forces confront each other across a narrow UNFICYP patrol track. Soldiers on both sides have been prone to deliberate acts of provocation, including shouting abuse, throwing stones and making obscene gestures. This invites retaliation in kind and can easily escalate if UNFICYP does not interpose itself quickly to calm tensions and maintain a physical presence until tempers have cooled. In past years such incidents have resulted in a number of fatalities.

15. To reduce such dangers, UNFICYP has for a number of years attempted to convince the two sides to pull their troops further back in areas where they are only metres apart. In May 1989, UNFICYP succeeded in concluding an unmanning agreement with the two sides whereby they agreed to withdraw their forces from selected positions in Nicosia (S/20663, para. 14). UNFICYP is pursuing efforts to arrive at similar agreements for other areas in Nicosia and its suburbs.

16. In addition to its constant endeavours to maintain the military status quo, UNFICYP must also act to preserve the integrity of the buffer zone from unauthorized entry or activities by civilians. As a result, UNFICYP has become increasingly involved in crowd-control. Civilian demonstrations near the cease-fire line on the Greek Cypriot side have often degenerated into individual or mass attempts to enter the buffer zone with the declared purpose of crossing to the other side. Such attempts, if successful, can provoke serious incidents, as was the case on several occasions in 1989 and 1990. While the primary responsibility

for preventing demonstrators from crossing the cease-fire line rests with the civilian authorities concerned, experience has shown that UNFICYP troops and UNCIVPOL must be deployed in large numbers to prevent demonstrators from entering the buffer zone. During the first 10 months of 1990, UNFICYP troops and UNCIVPOL had to be present at 53 demonstrations. In addition, each year UNCIVPOL investigates hundreds of other incidents occurring in the buffer zone, such as unauthorized entry by civilians, traffic accidents, theft, shooting, unauthorized activities and fires.

B. Economic and humanitarian activities

17. The second function entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council is to promote a return to normal conditions. Towards this end it carries out a number of economic and humanitarian activities. The economic activities are largely concerned with agriculture and industry inside the buffer zone and with public utilities that cross the buffer zone. The humanitarian activities are largely concerned with Greek and Turkish Cypriots living in the other community.

18. A major means which UNFICYP employs to promote the restoration of normal conditions is to encourage and facilitate the resumption of farming in the buffer zone, which covers about 3 per cent of the island and includes some of the most valuable agricultural land. Farming and other economic activities in the buffer zone are allowed, provided that ownership can be proven and that the activities present no security threat to either side or to UNFICYP. Farming permits are issued to proven owners of land, the great majority of whom are Greek Cypriots. As a result of active UNFICYP policy, farming has now been extended to almost the limit of available land. To take into account the security requirements of the two sides as well as the safety of the farmers, UNFICYP has drawn up farming security lines to delimit the farming area within the buffer zone (up to 400 m from the cease-fire line of the other side). In areas that have proven to be contentious, farmers from either community are escorted by UNFICYP troops on a daily basis. To prevent violations of UNFICYP's farming regulations and to deal with incidents that may raise tensions or endanger the lives of the farmers, UNFICYP must keep the farming area under constant supervision from observation posts or through patrols. In addition to agricultural activities, there are in the buffer zone a number of industries, mines and quarries that have been reactivated with UNFICYP support. Here also frequent patrolling is necessary to ensure that conditions are met and incidents avoided.

19. Another important function of UNFICYP concerns public utilities, particularly in the sensitive sectors of water and electricity. Electric power in the northern part of the island is supplied by the southern part. Water sources originating on one side or the other flow across the cease-fire lines and sometimes back, criss-crossing the buffer zone. UNFICYP therefore has a major responsibility in patrolling the lines and pipes, as well as in helping to maintain them, to resolve disputes over the allocation of water or electricity and in providing liaison between the relevant authorities on the two sides.

20. UNFICYP is also active in the prevention of diseases which could originate in the buffer zone. For example, to prevent malaria, UNFICYP regularly escorts anti-mosquito spraying teams from both communities in the buffer zone, usually once every two weeks, amounting to 56 escorts a month in one sector alone. UNFICYP troops and UNCIVPOL also patrol the buffer zone to prevent unauthorized garbage and sewage disposal. UNFICYP has also had to fight fires, in one recent case bringing under control a fire that started on one side of the cease-fire line, crossed into the buffer zone and threatened to reach the other side.

21. In the humanitarian area, UNFICYP (military personnel and UNCIVPOL) discharges important functions with regard to the welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island. Similarly, UNFICYP undertakes regular visits to Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part. In addition, UNFICYP provides support to the relief operations co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and discharges certain functions handed over by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus in June 1977. b/

22. UNFICYP's principal activities in the performance of its humanitarian functions, which as the figures for 1989 in parentheses indicate can be quite numerous, include permanent or temporary transfers of persons across the buffer zone (179); arranging meetings of divided families at the Ledra Palace in the buffer zone at Nicosia (7); deliveries of food, medicines, clothing and fuel to Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island (weekly); arranging transportation for patients in the northern part to hospitals in the southern part (231); procuring medical supplies in the south for authorities in the northern part (20); arranging visits to prisoners by family members living on the other side (16); and delivering pension and social welfare payments to Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of the island (26).

C. Organization of the Force

23. The strength and deployment of UNFICYP must obviously be based on its functions and the conditions under which it has to operate.

24. The operational elements of UNFICYP comprise a headquarters and four battalions, each responsible for a sector of the buffer zone (Denmark, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada and Austria, from west to east). The current strength of the battalions is as follows: Denmark (323), the United Kingdom (320), Canada (538) and Austria (388). In addition, the United Kingdom provides a scout car squadron (107) and a support regiment (284). The United Kingdom also provides some 30 engineers for 4 periods 6 weeks each year to maintain the patrol track throughout the buffer zone. Each of these countries as well as Finland, Ireland and Sweden provide personnel for UNFICYP headquarters and the military police. Australia and Sweden provide the two UNCIVPOL contingents (20 and 18 respectively). In addition, a United Nations international civilian staff is responsible for various functions at UNFICYP headquarters. Finally, locally hired personnel from both communities work at UNFICYP and the contingent headquarters.

25. Each battalion comprises a battalion headquarters, a headquarters company, including support services, and two line companies located at separate camps. Four members of each battalion are assigned full time to economic and humanitarian functions and are supported as necessary by others. Some 40 per cent of the troops perform line functions (man observation posts, patrol), about 20 per cent provide operational support (e.g., communications, force reserve, scout car and helicopter patrols) and the remaining 40 per cent provide logistic support (e.g., first-line transport repair, administration, personnel, medical and mess).

26. UNFICYP deploys its on-line force in observation posts and mobile patrols between observation posts, particularly where the posts are not in visual contact with each other. The on-line force is backed-up by a reserve force from each of the four battalions, supplemented by a reconnaissance squadron with its headquarters and two troops located in the United Nations Protected Area in Nicosia and one troop with each of the four battalions. These forces are underpinned by support elements in each contingent and by a support regiment located at UNFICYP headquarters. The two UNCIVPOL contingents divide between them their functions in the four sectors.

27. A significant element of UNFICYP is assigned to logistic support. This consists of a Logistic and Personnel Branch at headquarters with 15 military personnel who, with the support of the civilian administration, are responsible for co-ordinating the procurement of goods, services and equipment for UNFICYP. The UNFICYP Support Regiment of 284 military personnel located at UNFICYP headquarters provides full logistic support for the United Kingdom contingent and most of the logistic support for the remainder of the Force, while the three other contingents supplement, to varying degrees, the logistic support services provided by UNFICYP. The Support Regiment includes an engineer detachment, a signal squadron, a transport squadron, electrical and mechanical workshops, an aviation squadron, an ordnance detachment and a headquarters squadron, including a medical centre. Some 449 local employees work at UNFICYP, of whom 153 are 100 per cent United Nations-funded, 162 are 30 per cent United Nations-funded and 70 per cent United Kingdom-funded and 134 are 100 per cent contingent-funded.

28. While the functions of UNFICYP and the overall situation on the ground have not changed since the review in 1980, the strength of UNFICYP has been reduced by some 400 all ranks and by 13 permanently manned observation posts. The most recent organizational change occurred in December 1987 with the departure of the Swedish battalion (353). The number of sectors were reduced from five to four. The former Swedish sector was divided between the Austrian and Canadian sectors. Austria and Canada agreed to increase the size of their contingents by 100 and 60 all ranks respectively. This resulted in a net overall reduction of about 200 military personnel. At the same time, the number of permanently manned observation posts in the buffer zone was reduced from 62 to 52.

D. Observations

29. In reviewing the functions of UNFICYP, the Team concluded that the manner in which UNFICYP carries out its functions is determined by certain salient features of the situation in Cyprus that do not exist in comparable peace-keeping operations elsewhere and that need to be taken into account when considering the organization and operation of UNFICYP.

30. In particular, there is still no formal agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides on the complete delineation of the cease-fire lines and on the use and control of the buffer zone. The parties persist in their attempts to establish their own version of the cease-fire line. In certain areas, the two sides remain dangerously close to each other. This can easily fuel incidents and tensions, which can be controlled only by UNFICYP's continuous presence throughout the buffer zone and, if necessary, the rapid deployment of troops between the two sides. The buffer zone contains five populated villages (four Greek Cypriot villages and one mixed Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot village) and a variety of civilian activities are undertaken there by members of both communities. Furthermore, there are frequent civilian demonstrations close to the cease-fire line on the Greek Cypriot side, with attendant risks of unauthorized breaches of the buffer zone. These require UNFICYP to perform a significant role in crowd control.

31. In view of the circumstances described above, it was evident to the Team that the maintenance of the status quo and the prevention of a recurrence of fighting are not self-sustaining. In this respect, the assessment made in the 1980 review remains valid. The relative calm that prevails between the cease-fire lines is the result of UNFICYP's presence and efforts. The Team has no doubt that, given the prevailing conditions, an active presence by UNFICYP is necessary if its mandate is to be fulfilled.

32. The present method of presence, observation and reaction, using observation posts, observation points and checkpoints, together with regular patrolling, is an effective method of carrying out UNFICYP's mandate. The visible presence of UNFICYP remains an indispensable feature in preventing or controlling incidents that could otherwise escalate into possible hostilities. The deployment of the Force all along the cease-fire lines remains necessary to enable UNFICYP to be present where and when required.

33. The economic and humanitarian activities enable UNFICYP both to prevent incidents in the buffer zone and to promote a return to normal conditions in the buffer zone and across the cease-fire lines. Furthermore, these functions, which bring UNFICYP personnel in frequent contact with Greek and Turkish Cypriots of all walks of life, generate goodwill and understanding that facilitate UNFICYP's task in the military area.

34. Over the past 10 years the overall strength of UNFICYP and the number of permanently manned observation posts have been reduced by about 20 per cent. The Team is of the view that UNFICYP's on-line presence has been stretched as far as it can be and that no further reductions in its on-line deployment are possible without impairing its ability to implement its current functions. Unless,

therefore, the Force's mandate is changed, which the Team does not advocate, any further reduction in UNFICYP's strength should be achieved without impairing the number of troops deployed on the line. The Team returns to this point in section III below.

II. COST AND FINANCING OF THE FORCE

35. UNFICYP is the only United Nations peace-keeping operation that is not financed from assessed contributions by States Members of the Organization. In accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964), the costs of the Force are met by the Governments providing the contingents and by voluntary contributions received for this purpose by the United Nations. In addition, the Government of Cyprus provides at no cost areas for the headquarters, camps and other premises of UNFICYP.

36. This arrangement for financing a peace-keeping force has proven most unsatisfactory and particularly unfair to the troop-contributing countries, which have had to shoulder a disproportionate share of the cost. Not only do they absorb their share as envisaged in resolution 186 (1964), which represents about 70 per cent of the total cost of UNFICYP, but the continuous shortfall in voluntary contributions has caused the United Nations to be 10 years in arrears in paying them the sums due for reimbursement of their extra and extraordinary expenses. This unsatisfactory situation has plagued UNFICYP throughout its existence and has persistently grown worse, resulting in an ever larger deficit. At the time of the previous review in 1980 it was $88.9 million; it is now $174.5 million.

A. Cost to troop-contributing Governments

37. Under the existing arrangements, the troop-contributing Governments make available to the United Nations troops whose regular pay and allowances and normal matériel expenses they have agreed to pay themselves. The estimated amounts absorbed during each six-month mandate period by each of the troop-contributing Governments, as reported by them, are as follows:

(In thousands of United States dollars)

Australia	500
Austria	1 900
Canada	10 700
Denmark	650
Ireland	64
United Kingdom	19 000
Total	32 814

The above amounts include the regular pay and allowances of the troops and normal matériel expenses as well as certain extra and extraordinary costs which some troop-contributing Governments have volunteered to finance as a further

contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus. In addition, it should be pointed out that the United Nations, unlike in other peace-keeping operations, does not pay troops serving in UNFICYP incidental personal expenses or recreational leave.

B. Voluntary contributions

38. Appeals for voluntary contributions for the financing of UNFICYP are sent by the Secretary-General to all States Members of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies following each mandate renewal. In addition, the Secretary-General issues special appeals from time to time. Despite these efforts the contributions received consistently fall short of the funds needed by the United Nations to cover the costs for which it is responsible. As of 30 November 1990, pledges made have amounted to $439.5 million. Since the inception of the Force, only 77 countries have pledged contributions to UNFICYP. During the past 10 years the number has dwindled to 50 (see appendix I for details).

C. Cost to the United Nations

39. The United Nations is responsible for (a) the operational costs for administrative and logistic support described in paragraph 45 below (e.g., rations, fuel, hire of vehicles, maintenance of premises, salaries and travel of non-military personnel) and (b) extra and extraordinary costs incurred by the troop-contributing Governments for which they seek reimbursement on the basis of separate agreements concluded by the United Nations with each of the troop-contributing Governments. These costs can be paid only from the voluntary contributions received for this purpose.

40. Since the inception of UNFICYP on 27 March 1964 the expenditures for which the United Nations is responsible have amounted to $630.5 million, of which $211.6 million represents the operational costs and $418.9 million the extra and extraordinary expenditures claimed by troop-contributing Governments.

41. The financial position of UNFICYP from the inception of the Force in 1964 to the end of the current mandate period is as follows:

(In thousands of United States dollars)

Total costs to the United Nations		630.5
Voluntary contributions pledged	439.5	
Miscellaneous income	16.5	
Shortfall		(174.5)

42. The estimated costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the most recent six-month period are $13.8 million, of which the operational costs amount to $6.5 million and the reimbursement to troop-contributing Governments to $7.3 million (see appendix II for comparison of voluntary contributions received and cost to the United Nations for each mandate period over the past 10 years).

43. The latest extra and extraordinary expenses claimed by the troop-contributing Governments for one six-month period are as follows:

(In thousands of United States dollars) a/

Austria	1 510
Canada	615
Denmark	5 838
Finland	157
Ireland	35
Sweden	42
Total	8 197

a/ At November 1990 exchange rates.

The United Kingdom does not claim any extra and extraordinary costs. Australia does not claim any extra and extraordinary costs for its UNCIVPOL contingent.

44. Since most of the operational costs incurred by the United Nations pertain to logistic support, the Team paid particular attention to the arrangements for logistic support and to efforts at cost-cutting.

45. The existing arrangements are as follows. The United Kingdom provides the Support Regiment and the three Gazelle helicopters that make up UNFICYP's aviation squadron. In addition, the United Kingdom contributes £1.7 million annually towards the logistic support costs incurred by UNFICYP for the remainder of the Force. The United Kingdom Support System in Cyprus also provides an arrangement whereby UNFICYP utilizes the United Kingdom's bulk purchasing system to obtain goods, services and equipment. Goods and services that are not available through United Kingdom sources or that are more competitively priced elsewhere are obtained from commercial or other sources. This arrangement has enabled UNFICYP to keep its own staff dealing with commercial procurement significantly below what would otherwise be necessary. Of the $11.9 million operational costs incurred by UNFICYP in 1989, commercial procurement amounted to $5.6 million and goods and services procured through the United Kingdom Support System amounted to $6.3 million.

46. UNFICYP undertakes periodic market surveys to monitor the cost-effectiveness of goods, services and equipment purchased through the United Kingdom Support System. As a result, it was recently decided to replace a number of United Kingdom-hired all-terrain vehicles with similar vehicles rented commercially.

Similarly, following a recent review of locally hired staff, it was decided to phase out 57 positions over and above the 65 positions that were eliminated between 1980 and 1985. Another area where savings have been achieved is in utilities, particularly as a result of the introduction of solar heating systems.

47. Vehicles are a major component of the logistic support. Canada and the United Kingdom provide all vehicles for their contingents at no cost to the United Nations. Austria provides an agreed number of vehicles for which the United Nations pays the lowest locally available equivalent rate. Most of the vehicles required by the Danish contingent, as well as those required by UNFICYP headquarters, are hired by the United Nations from the United Kingdom hire system or local commercial sources. Over the years, UNFICYP has introduced a number of measures to keep the cost of hiring and operating its vehicles as low as possible. This includes the introduction of less costly and more fuel-efficient vehicles and a system of mileage allocation to all units of UNFICYP.

48. As can be seen from appendix II, UNFICYP has over the past 10 years succeeded in reducing the cost for which the United Nations is responsible from $14.8 million per mandate period in 1981 to $13.8 million in 1990, over a period in which inflation amounted to some 56 per cent.

D. Cost to the Government of Cyprus

49. In accordance with article 19 of the agreement concerning the status of the Force, c/ the Government of Cyprus provides without cost such areas for headquarters, camps and other premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfilment of the functions of the Force, as well as such alterations, additions or repairs as are necessary to render the areas fit for the purposes for which they are intended.

50. The Team was informed that UNFICYP was still being charged by both sides for water, electricity and garbage and sewage disposal. In this connection, it shares the view of the 1980 Survey Team that these services should be rendered to UNFICYP free of charge, bearing in mind, in particular, the extensive assistance given by UNFICYP to both sides in the upkeep of those services in various parts of the island (see para. 19 above).

E. Observations

51. It is evident that the present method of financing UNFICYP is most unsatisfactory. Even though the troop-contributing Governments absorb most of the costs of UNFICYP, voluntary contributions have consistently proven insufficient to cover the costs for which the United Nations is responsible. Despite persistent efforts by the Secretary-General to appeal for more voluntary contributions, the amount received over the past 10 years has decreased, as has the number of Governments that make contributions. There is no reason to believe that this situation will improve and that voluntary contributions can become a viable means of financing the United Nations share of UNFICYP costs. If UNFICYP had not

succeeded over the past 10 years in reducing the costs for which the United Nations is responsible, the deficit would have increased at an even more rapid pace. At the same time, it should be recognized that the cost-cutting measures implemented over the past years have stretched UNFICYP to the limit and therefore it cannot be expected that further savings are available from this source.

52. The Team is of the view that this situation should not be allowed to persist. Apart from its inequity, it could jeopardize the very existence of the Force. The departure of the Swedish contingent in 1987 was in large measure due to UNFICYP's financial crisis. Recently, Denmark has indicated that it is considering the withdrawal of its contingent for similar reasons. In this connection, the Team can only echo the Secretary-General's repeated appeal that the method of financing the portion of UNFICYP costs for which the United Nations is responsible be changed so that in the future it is financed from assessed contributions. It would also be important for all Member States, in particular those that have not made voluntary contributions in recent years and those that are in a position to increase their contributions, to do so in order to help to defray the outstanding amounts due to the troop-contributing Governments since 1981.

III. OVERALL EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

53. In considering the options for altering UNFICYP's operation and organization, the following findings described above should be kept in mind:

(a) The functions of UNFICYP (maintenance of the status quo and prevention of a recurrence of fighting, and the promotion of a return to normal conditions) remain valid and necessary;

(b) Because of the absence of agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides, the maintenance of the status quo and the prevention of a recurrence of fighting are not self-sustaining. The visible presence of the Force and its deployment all along the buffer zone remain necessary to enable UNFICYP to be present where and when required;

(c) While the functions and tasks of UNFICYP and the conditions under which it has to operate are the same as in 1980, the number of permanently manned observation posts has been significantly reduced and has reached the minimum acceptable level. The number of on-line troops necessary to man the permanent and temporary observation posts, checkpoints, patrols, etc. could not be reduced any further without impairing the Force's ability to carry out the necessary functions arising from its mandate;

(d) UNFICYP's current reliance on voluntary contributions to finance the costs for which the United Nations is responsible will jeopardize its future and should be changed to assessed contributions;

(e) The cost-cutting measures implemented by UNFICYP over the past 10 years have reached their limit. Any further cuts could impair the effectiveness of the Force.

54. In the light of these findings, the Team examined, with the Force Commander and his staff, several possible changes in UNFICYP's method of operations that might result in economies without undermining its ability to carry out its necessary functions. In particular, the Team considered two possibilities: replacing all or part of the Force's infantry battalions with military observers; and reducing the number of sectors, and therefore of battalions, from four to three.

55. It will be clear from the foregoing description of UNFICYP's operations that much of its effort is devoted to observation. Indeed, its most labour-intensive function is to maintain 24-hour observation of the cease-fire lines and the buffer zone, using permanently manned observation posts, temporarily manned observation points, checkpoints and mobile patrols by foot, vehicle or helicopter. The question that the Team addressed was whether all or part of this observation function could be more economically carried out, without unacceptable loss of operational efficiency, by United Nations military observers rather than by infantry personnel as at present.

56. In addressing this question, the Team had in mind two existing peace-keeping operations that might provide models for a revised UNFICYP operation. The first was the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) which, apart from support personnel, consists entirely of unarmed United Nations military observers, most of them in the rank of captain or major. UNIIMOG does not maintain observation posts but carries out its mandate of monitoring the cease-fire between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq by means of mobile patrols and liaison with the two sides. It uses the techniques of persuasion and negotiation to restore the status quo when it learns, from its own observations or from complaints by one of the parties, that a cease-fire violation has occurred. The second possible model was the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) which is deployed between the forces of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic on the Golan Heights in the Syrian Arab Republic. UNDOF is an infantry force to which is attached a group of United Nations military observers, known as Observer Group Golan. The United Nations military observers man a number of observation posts from which they watch for any violations of the status quo, including especially any unauthorized activities in the area of separation agreed between the two sides. If a violation is observed, the United Nations military observers call upon one of UNDOF's infantry units to investigate and deal with the matter.

57. If an unarmed observer mission is to be able to monitor a cease-fire and control a buffer zone, certain requirements must be met. There must be clear agreement between the parties about the delineation of the cease-fire lines and established rules about what is and is not permitted under the cease-fire. The cease-fire lines should be sufficiently far apart to reduce the risk of provocative actions leading to an unplanned resumption of hostilities. The observers should have freedom of movement behind the cease-fire lines and should enjoy the full co-operation of the parties, including acceptance of their decisions in disputed cases. Above all, the situation must be one in which intervention and negotiation by unarmed military observers will be sufficient to control any local rise in tension, without there being a need for the United Nations to interpose itself physically between the two sides.

58. Those requirements are not fulfilled in the current situation in Cyprus. There is no clear agreement between the two sides about the complete delineation of the cease-fire lines or about what is permitted under the cease-fire. The cease-fire lines are in some places extremely close to each other. As part of its mandate, UNFICYP encourages the resumption of economic activity in the buffer zone, but because of the intense distrust between the two sides, this activity has to be carefully controlled by UNFICYP to ensure that it does not lead to incidents. These facts require UNFICYP not only to be able to observe incidents that could lead to a resumption of hostilities but also to carry out the preventive function of deploying, very rapidly, armed troops to occupy the ground between the two sides when an incident threatens to get out of control. In the Team's view these considerations rule out the option of turning UNFICYP into an observer mission.

59. The alternative option of dividing UNFICYP's functions between the infantry and military observers was also examined. The Team considered whether savings could be made by retaining UNFICYP's infantry presence in the areas of greatest tension, especially Nicosia and its suburbs, but relying on United Nations military observers in at least some of the rural areas where incidents have been comparatively few. In such areas, the United Nations military observers would man observation posts and conduct mobile patrols and would call on Force headquarters to provide reinforcement if needed. This is in fact very close to what UNFICYP is doing at present. The difference is that the observation posts are manned by private soldiers and non-commissioned officers, who are present in sufficient strength at each post to be able to deploy an armed patrol as soon as they observe an incident in their vicinity. On the UNDOF model, on the other hand, the observation posts would be manned by only two unarmed captains/majors, who would often be able only to report the incident, would lack the capacity to resolve it themselves and would have to call up assistance from elsewhere. Moreover, given the reluctance of the two sides in Cyprus to accept the cease-fire lines and their propensity to try to change them, the Team was of the view that there would be a risk that this reduction in UNFICYP's capacity to react quickly could lead to an increase in incidents in areas which, thanks to UNFICYP's presence, had previously been calm. The Team does not therefore recommend this option.

60. The other main option examined by the Team was the possibility of reducing the number of infantry battalions from four to three. As already described, the Team had come to the conclusion that the present strength on the line could not be reduced without seriously impairing UNFICYP's ability to carry out its mandate. Experience in other peace-keeping operations, however, has shown that important savings can be achieved by increasing the size of battalions and thus improving the ratio of line troops to support troops.

61. The Force Commander agreed with the Team that the concept of reducing UNFICYP from four battalions to three was viable because the headquarters and logistic support systems of the battalions that would remain would be able to support additional line troops. Under this arrangement the UNFICYP area of deployment would be divided into three sectors. The first sector would cover the western, rural part of the buffer zone, the second would cover Nicosia and its suburbs and the third would cover the eastern, rural part of the buffer zone. Each battalion would contain a headquarters company and two line companies, one of which would be

co-located with the battalion headquarters. The size of some of the line companies would have to be increased in order to avoid any reduction in the Force's strength on the line. Small adjustments might also be necessary to the composition of the line companies so that enough middle-ranking officers would be available to liaise and negotiate at the appropriate level with commanders on the two sides. This change in UNFICYP's organization would permit a net reduction of some 200 all ranks. The Team recommends that it be implemented.

62. The Team wishes to emphasize that, if this recommendation is accepted, it cannot be assumed that the Governments contributing the three battalions that would remain would be willing to make the necessary increases in their contingents while the present unsatisfactory financial arrangements for UNFICYP continue. Such an increase would require them to absorb additional costs without any improvement in the Organization's ability to reimburse them for their extra and extraordinary costs. The desirability of making the proposed change thus strengthens the case for financing the costs of UNFICYP for which the United Nations is responsible by means of assessed contributions.

63. As has been stressed throughout the present report, a major difficulty that affects UNFICYP is the absence of agreement on the cease-fire lines and on the use and control of the buffer zone, together with the continuing attempts by both sides to establish their version of the lines. UNFICYP's work would be greatly facilitated and its size and functions could be significantly reduced if a formal cease-fire agreement could be concluded, with agreed procedures for dealing with any violations and an undertaking by both sides to respect UNFICYP's control of the buffer zone. Since this does not appear possible, there are more modest steps that would reduce the number of incidents and ease tensions. One such step should be for the two sides to agree to the extension of the unmanning agreement to other parts of Nicosia and its suburbs. Another very useful step would be for the two sides to accept the UNFICYP aide-mémoire of 23 March 1989, which sets out the principles applied by UNFICYP for the maintenance of the status quo and for civilian activities in the buffer zone.

Notes

a/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980, document S/14275/Add.1.

b/ Ibid., Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1979, document S/13369, para. 12.

c/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1964, document S/5634, annex I.

Appendix I

Pledges and payments to the UNFICYP account since its inception on 27 March 1964 to 30 November 1990

(In United States dollars)

Country	Total pledges	Payments received
Antigua and Barbuda	500	500
Australia	3 319 889	3 319 889
Austria	5 440 000	3 190 000 a/
Bahamas	18 500	18 500
Barbados	8 500	8 500
Belgium	5 903 927	5 903 927
Botswana	500	500 b/
Brunei Darussalam	11 000	11 000
Cambodia	600	600 b/
Cameroon	28 853	28 853
Côte d'Ivoire	60 000	60 000 b/
Cyprus	8 756 359	8 756 359
Denmark	6 335 296	4 106 453 a/
Finland	1 050 000	1 050 000 a/, b/
France	172 870	172 870
Germany	31 819 411	31 819 411
Ghana	76 897	76 897 b/
Greece	25 320 311	25 320 311
Guyana	11 812	11 812 b/
Iceland	147 001	147 001
India	120 000	120 000
Indonesia	5 000	5 000
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	94 500	94 500 b/
Iraq	50 000	50 000 b/
Ireland	50 000	50 000 a/, b/
Israel	26 500	26 500 b/
Italy	10 497 030	10 497 030
Jamaica	36 533	36 533
Japan	7 240 000	7 240 000
Jordan	2 000	0
Kuwait	165 000	165 000
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1 500	1 500 b/
Lebanon	5 194	5 194
Liberia	11 821	11 821 b/
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	50 000	50 000 b/
Luxembourg	165 903	165 903
Malawi	6 363	6 363
Malaysia	17 500	17 500
Malta	6 710	6 710

Country	Total pledges	Payments received
Mauritania	4 370	4 370 b/
Morocco	20 000	20 000 b/
Nepal	2 400	2 400
Netherlands	2 518 425	2 518 425
New Zealand	71 137	71 137 b/
Niger	2 041	2 041 b/
Nigeria	48 070	48 070
Norway	12 273 265	12 273 265
Oman	8 000	8 000 b/
Pakistan	71 791	71 791
Panama	1 000	1 000
Philippines	16 039	16 039
Portugal	12 000	12 000
Qatar	21 000	21 000 b/
Republic of Korea	16 000	16 000 b/
Sierra Leone	46 425	46 425 b/
Singapore	9 000	9 000
Somalia	1 000	1 000 b/
Spain	387 647	387 647
Sri Lanka	4 000	4 000
Sweden	8 645 000	6 520 000 a/
Switzerland	12 508 865 c/	12 508 865
Thailand	8 500	8 500
Togo	10 217	10 217
Trinidad and Tobago	2 400	2 400 b/
Tunisia	3 000	3 000
Turkey	1 839 253	1 839 253 b/
United Arab Emirates	30 000	30 000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	85 505 113 d/	85 505 113 a/, d/
United Republic of Tanzania	7 000	7 000 b/
United States of America	208 096 092	203 758 792
Uruguay	14 000	14 000
Venezuela	63 000	63 000
Viet Nam	4 000	4 000 b/
Yugoslavia	140 000	140 000
Zaire	32 000	32 000
Zambia	45 379	45 379
Zimbabwe	24 918	24 918
Total	439 546 127 c/, d/	428 602 984

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to appendix I)

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a/ Payment has been made or will be made by means of an offset against amounts due to the Government.

b/ No contribution received since 1980.

c/ Does not include pledge of $2,127,660 for 1991.

d/ Does not include pledge and payment of $803,965 for 1991 recorded by means of an offset against government claims.

Appendix II

Cost of UNFICYP to the United Nations and voluntary contributions received per mandate period from June 1981 to December 1990

(In millions of United States dollars)

Mandate ending 15th of month	Cost estimates	Voluntary contributions received
June 1981	14.8	9.0
December 1981	14.7	8.8
June 1982	14.6	8.7
December 1982	14.8	8.6
June 1983	14.7	8.3
December 1983	14.3	8.4
June 1984	14.0	8.3
December 1984	14.2	8.2
June 1985	13.9	8.2
December 1985	14.0	8.1
June 1986	14.1	8.2
December 1986	14.3	8.5
June 1987	14.4	7.5
December 1987	15.5	9.2
June 1988	12.6	7.7
December 1988	12.6	9.5
June 1989	13.1	7.8
December 1989	13.1	9.3
June 1990	13.8	9.1
December 1990	13.8	4.1
Total	281.3	165.5

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LETTER DATED 5 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated 3 December 1990 in connection with the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

I should be grateful if you would have the text circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Yu. VORONTSOV

Annex

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

By adopting its resolution 678 on 29 November 1990, the Security Council issued a final warning to Iraq on the inadmissibility of continuing to ignore the will of the international community.

At the same time, both the letter and the spirit of the resolution offers a genuine chance of averting the worst scenario of the further development of events, namely, a military conflagration. The Security Council's decision establishes the time-frame within which a political, peaceful dénouement of the conflict can and must be sought. And it is necessary to act in such a way as not to miss that chance - so as to switch the course of events to the non-military option.

The view taken in the Soviet Union is that the "pause of goodwill" which the resolution allows must be filled with energetic diplomatic efforts oriented towards the earliest possible restoration of the situation which existed before 2 August 1990. Such efforts may be undertaken on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis, it being understood, of course, that they will be aimed at ensuring the full and unconditional compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolutions without any reward to the aggressor.

The initiative of President George Bush of the United States - his proposal for the holding of United States-Iraq contacts in Washington and Baghdad - is viewed in the Soviet Union from the same angle. It is thought that a dialogue between the United States of America and Iraq would be of considerable importance in finding practical approaches towards the unblocking of the highly dangerous situation in the Persian Gulf. In the Soviet Union the initiative is welcomed and viewed as a concrete embodiment of the mutual Soviet-American understanding as to the preferability of resolving the crisis by peaceful means.

The USSR for its part will also continue to do its utmost in order to test all possible ways towards a peaceful solution of the conflict, acting in the spirit of the consensus which has formed within the international community and, first and foremost, among the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The conviction in the Soviet Union is that it is for Iraq to make the next move. Whether or not there is to be peace in the Persian Gulf depends only on the Iraqi leadership. It must soberly assess the firm and resolute mood of the world community in favour of restoring international legality and security in the region, and it must act with reason and common sense. Baghdad must recognize that further delay in implementing the Security Council resolutions is inadmissible inasmuch as it constitutes a serious threat, above all to Iraq itself and to its people.

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6 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SRI LANKA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward herewith a revised memorandum on the economic difficulties arising out of the implementation by Sri Lanka of Security Council resolution 661 (1990) (see S/21710, annex).

This is submitted under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations.

A copy of this was sent to the Chairman of the Working Group of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990).

I would thank you to circulate this memorandum as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Daya PERERA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Revised memorandum, dated 30 November 1990, on the adverse economic and other consequences resulting from the imposition of sanctions under Security Council resolution 661 (1990)

On 5 September 1990, Sri Lanka submitted to the Security Council a memorandum covering the period ending 31 December 1990 setting out the adverse repercussions following the imposition of sanctions under Security Council resolution 661 (1990) (see S/21710, annex). However, as the problem seems unresolved and is likely to remain so for an indeterminate period, it has become necessary to revise the original memorandum. A revision was also necessitated by the fact that increases in the price of oil have exceeded original forecasts. This revised memorandum addresses both of those factors.

Sri Lanka has an open economy, which to a great extent depends on the performance of imports and exports, both of which are presently under severe stress owing to internal as well as external factors. The imposition of sanctions under Security Council resolution 661 (1990) has further aggravated this situation. This development will in turn lead to severe economic hardships as well as political and social instability.

Sri Lanka is currently engaged in combating terrorism and a substantial amount of its resources is being diverted for this purpose. Terrorism in Sri Lanka, which has threatened the well-entrenched democratic way of life and governance and the territorial integrity of the country, has retarded economic growth. The decline in resources for economic growth will in turn further weaken Sri Lanka's ability to counter this. Further, other priority sectors, which are equally important in providing the basic needs of the people, will be deprived of much-needed resources. A consequence of this would be continued political and social instability.

The adverse effects consequent on the observance of the sanctions are particularly felt in the following areas.

A. Export of tea

Tea is the second largest source of foreign exchange earnings and accounted for 15 per cent of total current account receipts in 1989. The Middle East absorbs approximately 55 per cent of tea exports. Iraq and Kuwait together accounted for around 12.15 per cent of the total exports and Iraq has been the second largest buyer of Sri Lankan tea. Consequent on the loss of the market in these two countries, Sri Lanka experienced a fall in tea prices owing to a lack of demand from a major buyer.

In the second half of 1989, the value of tea exported to Iraq and Kuwait was $US 25.6 million and $5.7 million, respectively. The general oversupply of tea on the world market will drastically reduce Sri Lanka's earnings from tea owing to a

decline in prices. In 1991, the decline in the tea export price from $2 to $1.20 per kilogram would imply a drop in earnings of $37 million. In 1992 and 1993, prices are projected to remain 13 per cent below the originally expected price - about $60 million less in total earnings than projected earlier. The indirect effects of a fall in prices would amount to another $15 million per year.

B. Other exports and imports

The total value of other exports to Iraq and Kuwait in 1989 was around $1 million. This market is completely closed to Sri Lankan exports since the eruption of the Gulf crisis. The loss of export markets can in no way be compensated for by a redirection of exports because of limited market accessibility and the prohibitive cost of breaking into new markets in an environment of protection.

C. Remittances by Sri Lankan expatriates in the Middle East

It is estimated that over 100,000 Sri Lankans were employed in Kuwait and a sizeable number in Iraq. While worker remittances from abroad are the third largest foreign exchange earner and were estimated at $360 million for 1991, remittances from Kuwait and Iraq constituted a fair share of the total, estimated at about $90 million annually.

The steady flow of remittances from these expatriates cushioned the adverse impact of the increase in oil prices.

This cushion no longer exists.

The loss of income-generating capacity from worker remittances cannot be limited to the dollar value of its loss. The sustenance of dependants, increases in national savings, enhanced investment activities and the growth of entrepreneurship at the small-scale enterprise level have now been greatly reduced. The impact can be seen in the decline in the activities of financial institutions as a result of the decline in savings and a reduction of their capacity to recover loans that have been financed on the understanding that there will be a steady flow of foreign remittances.

Based on the above assumption, the impact of the loss of remittances, excluding indirect repercussions, is expected to be $53 million in 1990. The overall impact in 1991, 1992 and 1993 is expected to be $207 million, $193 million and $125 million, respectively.

D. Price of crude oil

The anticipated increase in the cost of crude oil imports over the estimate made prior to the Gulf crisis, despite a 9 per cent reduction in volume, is $58.4 million for 1990. The average price of Sri Lanka's crude oil imports for the

balance of the year is estimated at $32 per barrel, which is more than 50 per cent higher than the prices prevailing during the first half of the year. This increase is mainly a result of a shortfall created by the removal of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil from the market. The average for 1991 is assumed to be $29 per barrel. In 1991, the impact will be felt fully and the bill for crude oil imports is expected to go up from $246 million to $377 million. The impact of this increase in 1991 is expected to be $131 million. The oil price shock has several indirect effects on other prices. Apart from an increase in import prices, there will be a general rise in local costs. Transportation costs have already risen. Marginal enterprises are likely to go out of business and industrial production will slacken.

E. Inflation and economic growth

Sri Lanka is already experiencing inflation, an average annual rate of 18.7 per cent. The impact of the escalation of the price of oil on Sri Lanka's import prices will add further pressure on inflation and raise the cost of industrial production. In the context of continuing inflationary pressure, the monetary policies will no doubt remain tight but this will lead to slower economic growth.

F. Socio-economic conditions

With the large-scale return to Sri Lanka of displaced workers from the Middle East, the high unemployment rate in the country, estimated at around 18 per cent, will be further aggravated. This could result in a reduction in the quality of life of lower-income groups of the population owing to the considerable reduction in remittances received from family members employed overseas. There could also be an adverse social impact on account of readjustment problems faced by the workers returning from the Middle East who have become accustomed to a different lifestyle based on high-income levels enjoyed overseas. The cost of rehabilitating the returning migrant workers is still to be fully determined. The cost of the repatriation of Sri Lankan workers from the Gulf financed by external assistance has not yet been fully determined, but is estimated to be $25 million. In addition to this, Sri Lanka has up to now incurred expenditure amounting to $5 million.

G. Overall economic situation

Sri Lanka is currently in the process of implementing an economic restructuring programme in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other multilateral donor agencies. The recent escalation of terrorist activities is already adding pressure on the operation of the restructuring programme. Compliance with resolution 661 (1990) will take these programmes further off course. The restructuring programme was based on the optimistic estimates of the earnings from tea exports and expatriate worker remittances, as well as the continuation of normal trends in respect of fuel prices, etc. The unexpected fall in foreign exchange earnings combined with the increase in the price of imports will have severe adverse implications on the

balance of payments and economic stability of Sri Lanka and thereby impose severe constraints on the working of the programme.

* * *

The cumulative effect of compliance with the Security Council resolution is not easily quantifiable. The invisible and indirect consequences and the time-span are equally important in gauging the overall effect of the sanctions on society as a whole.

Further, the impact of sanctions on an economy such as that of Sri Lanka, which is experiencing severe constraints, will be far more damaging than on a strong or larger economy capable of absorbing losses arising out of compliance with the sanctions.

Sri Lanka has been severely affected by the Gulf crisis because of several factors. Apart from the loss of a growing and lucrative tea market and the loss of remittances from migrant workers, the savings and investment capabilities of Sri Lankans have been reduced owing to reduced income generation. Additionally, the negative multiplier effects of the loss of income have an adverse impact on small-scale enterprises, finance companies and wholesale and retail businesses. Further, the returnees from Kuwait and Iraq will add to the unemployment problem, with adverse social consequences. Above all, the upsurge in oil prices puts tremendous pressure on the balance of payments, which is already under severe strain. The oil price increase alone is expected to increase Sri Lanka's external payments by as much as 20 per cent of export earnings. In addition, the increased air fares, together with higher insurance costs, will reduce tourist income while increased freight charges will raise prices of imports to Sri Lanka.

On the above basis, the impact of the Gulf crisis during the period from August 1990 to the end of 1993 is expected to be well beyond $1 billion. With all the ongoing readjustment efforts, the economy is not in a position to absorb a loss of revenue of this magnitude and to continue with its economic programmes, even at minimum levels, unless substantial economic assistance is made available to cushion these losses. If this assistance is not forthcoming Sri Lanka will suffer irreparable political, economic and social consequences.

Hence, the Security Council is requested to take immediate action to facilitate the mobilization of resources from bilateral, multilateral and other sources.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Agenda item 32
THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 29 November 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of our Governments, who are co-chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, we have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the communiqué of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, issued in Paris on 26 November 1990 (see annex).

We should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Pierre-Louis BLANC
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Nana S. SUTRESNA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Indonesia
to the United Nations

ANNEX

COMMUNIQUE

1. The Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council met in Paris on November 23 - 26, 1990 to assist the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia to bring about a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict. Joining them were Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Nana Sutresna as representative of Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Co-Chairman of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, and UN Under Secretary General Rafeeuddin Ahmed.

2. The meeting reviewed the positive results of the November 9-10 Working Group Meeting in Jakarta under the Co-Chairmanship of the two Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference. Building on the work of the Jakarta consultations and reflecting written contributions by a number of countries participating in the Working Group Meeting, the two Co-Chairmen and the Five reached consensus on a draft comprehensive political settlement developed directly from the framework agreement of August 28, 1990 which was endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 668 and by acclamation of the General Assembly on October 15.

This document contains a draft agreement covering the major aspects of the settlement with annexes dealing respectively with : the proposed mandate for UNTAC; withdrawal, cease-fire and related measures; elections; repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons; and principles for a new constitution for Cambodia. A draft agreement concerning the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia and a draft declaration on rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia were also elaborated.

3. The two Co-Chairmen and the Five have thus fulfilled the first necessary condition for the successful reconvening of the PCC.

The two Co-Chairmen are now in a position to present to the Coordinating Committee of the PCC a draft Agreement which could, after consideration by the Committee, be submitted for adoption by the Conference meeting at the ministerial level.

4. In the light of the positive results achieved at the present meeting, it is now urgent that the Cambodians themselves make their contribution to this process through the SNC. The Co-Chairmen and the Five therefore strongly urge the Cambodians to ensure that the SNC is fully functioning so that the Conference can be reconvened.

5. The two Co-Chairmen and the Five took note of the presence in Paris of Prince Sihanouk and expressed their strong hope that the members of the SNC would speedily resolve with him the outstanding issues which have so far prevented the SNC from playing its proper role in the settlement process. The Five welcomed the readiness of the two Co-Chairmen to meet with a functioning SNC in Paris in order to explain the contents of the draft Agreement and seek their support for it and its implementation.

6. The two Co-Chairmen and the Five believe that it is now urgent to resolve the problem of the leadership of the SNC. The Five reaffirmed their view that should Prince Sihanouk be elected Chairman, they would welcome this decision. They consider that related questions including the possible expansion of the SNC and the vice-chairmanship should be decided by the Cambodians themselves through consultations, flexibly and in a spirit of national reconciliation. They would expect that should Prince Sihanouk be elected Chairman, he and the other members of the SNC would approach these matters in such a spirit.

7. The Co-Chairmen, the Five and the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations call upon all the parties to the conflict to exercise maximum self-restraint so that the Paris Conference on Cambodia can be reconvened in a peaceful environment.

Paris, 26 November 1990

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/21986
7 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF COLOMBIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter of 16 November 1990, I have the honour to enclose herewith a working paper entitled "Framework for peace - Situation between Iraq and Kuwait" which is a follow-up of our earlier submission (see annex I). This working paper puts in concrete form the ideas of the earlier working paper of 16 November 1990 (see annex II). The paper provides a framework that can be usefully looked at by the members of the Security Council to promote a peaceful solution of the Gulf crisis, taking into consideration resolution 678 (1990) adopted on 29 November 1990.

In the words of the Secretary-General at the meeting of the Security Council on 29 November 1990, "the situation requires that diplomatic efforts be made with renewed determination to put the present crisis on the road to a peaceful outcome" (see S/PV.2963).

It is our opinion that we can serve the cause of peace no better than to work collectively to avoid the outbreak of war.

The ideas contained in the present working paper are not original. They take into consideration essential elements of what would constitute an acceptable package to Kuwait and Iraq, as well as the international community. These ideas as a whole do not detract from any of the relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council. They are premised on Iraqi compliance with the relevant resolutions resulting in a role for the United Nations, the lifting of sanctions, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region, negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, the role of arbitration and the prospects for a future security arrangement in the area. It is also envisaged that the successful resolution of the above would also lead to the Council actively considering wider conflicts in the region.

We are aware and supportive of recent developments relating to a possible meeting between Iraq and the United States. We believe that our own efforts on the basis of the present working paper can contribute in some measure towards enhancing the prospects of peace and diminishing the threats of war.

I would be grateful if you could distribute this letter and the working paper, as well as the letter and the working paper of 16 November 1990, as a document of the Security Council, for the consideration of other members. It is our intention to solicit the views of all members of the Council on this working paper in order to be in a position to determine the next steps to be taken.

(Signed) Enrique PEÑALOSA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Colombia to the United Nations

Annex I

5 December 1990

Working paper

Framework for peace - Situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Upon formal certification by the Secretary-General that Iraq has agreed to comply fully with its resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990), the Security Council:

First stage: during the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait

(a) Decides to dispatch a United Nations peace-keeping force to maintain peace in Kuwait as Iraqi forces withdraw and during the re-establishment of the Government of Kuwait and restoration of its effective authority;

(b) Entrusts the Secretary-General with the task of organizing the United Nations peace-keeping force in accordance with subparagraph (a) above and submitting specific proposals for approval by the Security Council;

(c) Provides the assurance that there shall not be any foreign intervention against Kuwait or/and Iraq and, in this regard, decides to station United Nations observer missions in both countries, including a military component, upon acceptance by Kuwait and Iraq, or either of the two that has given its acceptance.

Second stage: after completion of the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait

(a) Decides that the United Nations peace-keeping force shall verify the completion of withdrawal of all Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait;

(b) Decides that all sanctions against Iraq enacted through its previous resolutions be lifted with immediate effect;

(c) Decides that the foreign forces should withdraw from the region immediately;

(d) Requests the Secretary-General, in the context of subparagraph (c) above, to provide for the stationing of United Nations observer missions, where necessary;

(e) Entrusts the Secretary-General to exercise his good offices, with the assistance of countries of the region, to establish the basis for the settlement of the differences between Kuwait and Iraq, either through direct negotiations, resort to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or any other legal procedures agreed to by the parties;

(f) Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with Kuwait and Iraq and with other States in the region, to facilitate the preparation and prompt adoption of measures to be carried out under United Nations supervision to enhance their security and stability through urgent regional and international arrangements covering, inter alia, mutual assurances for non-aggression or/and non-intervention and arms and armed forces reduction;

(g) Decides that all financial claims between the parties, which are not settled equitably through negotiation between them, shall be referred to ICJ or any other legal procedures agreed to by the parties.

Annex II

Letter dated 16 November 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Permanent Missions of Colombia, Cuba, Malaysia and Yemen, I have the honour to transmit to you a working paper which throws light on the thrust and background ideas on a framework/initiative relating to the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait".

Consultations on the framework/initiative are continuing and its final form will be made available to members of the Council upon completion of the process.

Enrique PEÑALOSA
Permanent Representative of
Colombia to the United Nations

Enclosure

16 November 1990

Working paper

Framework/initiative relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Keeping our objectives in focus:

1. There is universal agreement that:

(a) Iraq must withdraw unconditionally and peacefully from Kuwait;

(b) Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and of the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait be restored;

(c) All foreign nationals must be freed;

(d) No country should be allowed to profit from aggression, and that action is liable to restitution and compensation under international law.

2. These objectives are embodied in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

3. Other objectives are of doubtful legitimacy under international law and outside present Security Council resolutions and could split the existing international consensus.

Peace framework: the best way to increase the effectiveness of sanctions and threat of use of force

1. The likelihood of a peaceful solution is increased to the extent that we can make it more favourable to Saddam Hussein to withdraw, yet without appeasing him/rewarding him or at the expense of our basic objectives.

2. Either the international community forcibly evicts Iraqi armed forces or Saddam Hussein decides to withdraw. In the first case, we achieve our objectives through actual use of force; in the second, through influence. It must be one or the other.

3. Unless and until the military forces now in Saudi Arabia are used to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, their purpose is to influence Iraq to withdraw. Similarly, sanctions are intended to influence a decision.

4. If Saddam Hussein is to decide to withdraw, the consequences to him of withdrawal must, at a minimum, look better to him than the consequences of staying.

5. The effectiveness of any influence strategy depends on the difference between the consequences Iraq can reasonably expect if it withdraws as against if it refuses.

6. Sanctions and military threats address only one side of the equation: what happens to Iraq if it refuses to comply with Security Council resolutions. They ignore the other side of the equation: the positive consequences Iraq can reasonably expect from withdrawal to avoid war and seek lifting of sanctions.

7. By failing to clarify the positive consequences of withdrawal, the Security Council decreases the likelihood that sanctions and the military option will produce a voluntary withdrawal.

Clarifications: complementary to sanctions and military pressure

1. If Iraq were to withdraw tomorrow from Kuwait under the terms of the Security Council resolutions adopted to date, it would be clear that:

(a) Economic sanctions would then stop;

(b) The threat of military attack would no longer be there;

(c) Claims against Iraq would be resolved through an acceptable mechanism in accordance with international law, such as arbitration by the International Court of Justice;

(d) Its dispute with Kuwait would be addressed through negotiations;

(e) Foreign troops massed in the region would be withdrawn;

(f) Iraqi withdrawal could offer new opportunities for the resolution of wider Middle East conflict.

2. We could clarify to Iraq that some or all of the steps outlined above would follow upon its withdrawal and the release of all hostages. Such clarification would be at no cost to our basic objectives and would significantly increase the likelihood of withdrawal.

3. Such an approach is not an alternative to sanctions and enforcement measures, but a complement; it improves the prospects for a diplomatic solution by highlighting and clarifying the difference between compliance and non-compliance.

4. Paragraph 3 of resolution 660 (1990) calls for immediate, intensive negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait; paragraph 12 of resolution 674 (1990) requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices for diplomatic efforts. The Security Council can reinforce these provisions by suggesting processes for post-withdrawal negotiations.

5. Substantive negotiations would occur only after compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Diplomatic contact before withdrawal would be limited to clarifying the framework for substantive negotiations.

War is more costly than sanctions

1. The current policy of sanctions deprives Iraq of benefits from its invasion and punishes it via the loss of oil revenues in excess of $100 million a day.

2. While the cost of continuing sanctions and maintaining forces are high, the costs of war would be significantly higher, with unpredictable consequences.

Some objections and concerns on the peace framework/initiative include:

1. Wrong timing, because Iraq has not shown any signs of flexibility.

2. Wrong message. It could be interpreted as division within the Council, or a diversion from the existing course of action by the Council and weakening in its resolve to confront Iraq.

3. Appeasement is tantamount to an appeasement to Saddam Hussein.

Some responses to the concerns

1. Timing. The timing for a peace framework/initiative is most relevant as there is now increasing concern and debate on the war option.

2. Giving sanctions a chance to work does not only mean to hurt Iraq to induce compliance but the process also allows the opening of a diplomatic door and encouraging Iraq to walk through it.

3. The objective of the peace framework/initiative is to give peace a chance and not to rush towards the war option.

4. An initiative by definition is not re-active but pro-active, and therefore we should not wait for a reaction from Saddam Hussein before taking up this peace framework/initiative.

5. Message. The message to Saddam Hussein is clear in that this is a serious attempt at seeking compliance with Security Council resolution 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990). Contrary to apprehensions about deviation and disunity within the Council, it is a message seeking compliance with existing Security Council resolutions, which has the unanimous support of the Council and indeed the whole of the United Nations membership, carrying with it the necessary moral weight that Saddam Hussein should heed.

6. Appeasement. This is not appeasement but a realistic framework to seek compliance with Security Council resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) by peaceful means, failing which he would have to face other enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

7. Sanctions should stay in place unless and until Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Clarifying the consequences of withdrawal as contained in the peace framework does not harm our vital interests

1. Even if Iraq were to withdraw from Kuwait tomorrow, post-withdrawal actions would have to be undertaken. We lose nothing by specifying those conditions now. Indeed, we gain because we are now in a position to state those unilaterally; once Iraq withdraws, it would be in a position to negotiate over those conditions.

2. We need not change the current policy of sanctions and threat of the use of force. Thus, there is little risk that Iraq would interpret such conditions as a sign of weakness.

Talk of war option establishes its own momentum, which increases the risk of war

1. Given the cultural gap and lack of direct, face-to-face communication between the principal parties and the overall atmosphere of suspicion, there is a high probability that any Iraqi "signal" of "flexibility" would either be ignored, discounted as insincere or otherwise misinterpreted.

2. Given the overwhelming negative consequences now attached to withdrawal, Iraq is not likely to send a signal of flexibility that is sufficiently strong and clear to be understood until war is imminent, by which time it may be too late to stop the momentum towards war.

How to increase the effectiveness of sanctions

1. Keep sanctions in place.

2. Continue to demand that Iraq comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

3. Maintain the United Nations insistence that Iraq should not benefit from its aggression, but change the consequences of Iraq's withdrawal from the uncertainties that exist under current Security Council resolutions to a peace framework envisaged in the Security Council resolution that would be proposed.

Conclusion: Peace framework/initiative is the best course of action

1. The peace framework/initiative, rather than being contrary to Security Council resolutions, provides greater specificity about what Iraq can expect after withdrawal and increases the chances of persuading Iraq to comply with Security Council resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990).

2. "Waiting" for "a signal" of "until the time is right" while there is talk of war option increases the risk of war.

3. Under the circumstances, pursuit of the peace framework/initiative is necessary now to give peace a chance instead of rushing to the war option.

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LETTER DATED 6 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 674 (1990), I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on Iraq's grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention in Kuwait. I should be grateful if you would have the report circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING

Annex

Submission of information to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 674 (1990)

INTRODUCTION

In paragraph 2 of resolution 674 (1990), the Security Council invited States to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph 1 of the resolution and to make this information available to the Council. The present report is in response to that invitation.

Paragraph 1 of resolution 674 (1990) demanded that Iraq immediately cease and desist from taking third-State nationals hostage, mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-State nationals and any other actions violating the decisions of the Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law. In collating substantiated information on grave breaches of Iraq as per paragraph 1, the United States has focused on grave breaches as defined in article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949). Consequently the information contained in this report is categorized in accordance with the grave breaches listed in article 147. The United States notes that it may submit in future reports collated substantiated information on grave breaches as defined in article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949), as well as information on other violations described in paragraph 1 of resolution 674 (1990).

The information contained in the present report concerns United States nationals, Kuwaiti nationals, and other third-country nationals in both Iraq and Kuwait. Such persons are protected pursuant to article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention since they are in the hands of a party to a conflict, or in the hands of an occupying Power, of which they are not nationals.

The United States has obtained this information from a variety of sources, including eyewitness accounts reported to the United States Government, reports of credible humanitarian organizations and press reports. The United States has carefully assessed the accuracy and reliability of this information and has determined to the best of its ability that the information is substantiated.

Iraq: grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention

Wilful killing

Report date	Incident
12 August 1990	A British citizen was killed by an Iraqi soldier at a checkpoint near the Kuwait/Saudi border on 11 August 1990 at approximately 1800 hours. An American who knew the victim and witnessed the shooting stated that, at the time of the shooting, the convoy in which the British citizen was driving was complying with an order to return in the direction of Kuwait City. (DOS a/)
31 August 1990	The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities condemned the Iraqi Government after studying reliable reports of mass extrajudicial executions, enforced or involuntary disappearances and arbitrary detention in Iraq. (AFP, DOS)
15 September 1990	Kuwaiti sources report that, on the sixth day of the invasion, Iraqi troops unplugged the oxygen to incubator equipment supporting 22 hospitalized premature babies. All of the infants died. At two other hospitals the oxygen and intravenous drips for two patients were disconnected, causing their deaths. (DOS)
15 September 1990	Kuwaiti official sources report that a food co-operative director in Sabahiyah was shot on 9 September 1990 for objecting to demands that he turn over all of his food to Iraqi troops. (DOS)
17 September 1990	United States Government sources report numerous executions of Kuwaiti 15-20 year olds. Sources also claim that the Iraqis are burning neighbourhood areas in which resistance activities have taken place. (DOS)
24 September 1990	The Kuwait Al-Qabas Al-Duwali of 16 September 1990 reported that Iraqi soldiers executed 17 persons. Twelve of the 17 were doctors and assistant doctors from Kuwait City who were killed in retaliation for the death of two Iraqi soldiers who died in the hospital after surgery. United States Government sources report that five medical workers were killed in this incident. (DOS)

Report date	Incident
2 October 1990	Amnesty International reports allegations that scores of people were hanged on the grounds of Kuwait University. They claim they were suspected opponents of the Iraqi Government who were accused of criminal offences. Numerous other civilians are reported to have been killed because of suspected opposition to the Iraqi forces. (AI)
2 October 1990	Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) passed a decree on 11 August 1990 making the hoarding of food for commercial purposes punishable by death. On 14 August 1990 it proclaimed the death penalty for anyone guilty of looting. As of October, 10 people have been executed for this offence. RCC also decreed the death penalty for anyone caught harbouring Western nationals. One person is reported to have been executed for this act. (AI)
10 October 1990	Many civilians have reportedly been executed for non-violent expression of their opposition to the Iraqi invasion. On 8 August 1990 three youngsters were killed when Iraqi soldiers fired at a demonstration of 35 persons. Three Pakistanis were reportedly killed on 21 August 1990 while attempting to flee Kuwait for Saudi Arabia. (HRC)
10 October 1990	Eyewitness testimony relates seeing one resistance worker tortured and shot, and a Kuwaiti woman in labour refused entrance at the Maternity Hospital. Soldiers thrust a bayonet through her stomach. (HRC)
12 October 1990	The number of executions of individuals for involvement in resistance activities in Kuwait is approximately 148. (DOS)
12 October 1990	Six youngsters were hanged at a university for distributing leaflets. Four people were shot for possession of a camera and a photocopy machine. A family of seven was shot for possession of a United States passport, not theirs. The manager of a food co-operative was shot for refusing to display a photo of Saddam Hussein. Two youths were shot in front of their parents in Rumaiythia. (Congress)
16 October 1990	An 18-year-old student was arrested for possession of a shotgun. He was tortured during questioning and later returned to his home, where he was shot in front of his family. The family was not allowed to remove his body until permission could be obtained from police authorities the next morning. (Congress)

Report date	Incident
20 October 1990	In a two-month period there have been over 612 recorded deaths, according to cemetery reports: 113 of these were children deprived of medical care, and 82 were adults shot in the head by Iraqi soldiers; and 372 were assigned to natural causes, though many are believed to have resulted from the forcible eviction of patients from hospitals. Another 45 adults died of gunshot wounds. (Congress)
20 October 1990	A 35-year-old Kuwaiti was arrested and held prisoner for 15 days. He was later released and, when he arrived home, was shot from behind in full view of his family. (Congress)

Torture or inhuman treatment

Report date	Incident
2 October 1990	Amnesty International has received numerous reports of the routine torture of detainees. Methods of torture are said to include rape, electric-shock treatment, prolonged beatings, breaking of limbs, plucking out of hair, extraction of finger- and toe-nails, threats of sexual assault and executions, and mock executions. (AI)
4 October 1990	Witnesses report seeing blindfolded civilians, clearly the victims of torture, being helped out of the Iraqi Embassy in Kuwait in visits there prior to 24 August 1990. (DOS)
5 October 1990	A former Iraqi-American prisoner reported that he saw a second gaoled prisoner in Iraq hung from the ceiling and beaten. (DOS)
8 October 1990	United States Government and news sources report that Iraqi intelligence has established an interrogation and torture centre in Kuwait City. One hospital alone was brought 230 bodies from the centre. (DOS, LAT)
10 October 1990	Eyewitness testimony related seeing Iraqi soldiers rape two women in Kuwait, and take schoolboys claiming membership in the resistance, and put lit cigarettes in their eyes during interrogation. (HRC)
10 October 1990	United States Government sources report that a Kuwaiti Islamic activist was arrested when he caught Iraqi troops looting his neighbour's home. The troops took him away, shaved his beard, administered electric shocks and burned him with cigarette butts. (DOS)

Report date	Incident
12 October 1990	Three young people were handcuffed, blindfolded and submerged in a swimming pool for possession of a video tape of a Saudi Arabian television programme. Torture centres have been set up at various schools, sports clubs and public buildings. (Congress)
12 October 1990	Kuwaiti officials claim that 18 people died when 480 handicapped persons were expelled from a care facility and left on the road outside the institution. (DOS)
20 October 1990	United States Government sources charge that one arrestee was forced to undergo four days of systematic torture. He was beaten until unconscious and when he regained consciousness he was kicked and forced to undergo electric-shock treatment until he lost consciousness again. This treatment was repeated each time he awakened. (Congress)
26 October 1990	In testimony before the United Kingdom's House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, a woman claimed that it was common practice to pull out the eyes of torture victims, to pull off their finger- and toe-nails, to shoot civilians in front of family members and to subject Kuwaitis to crucifixion. She also stated that a 15-year-old boy had tried to commit suicide after suffering 17 days of torture by Iraqis. Another woman testified that the Iraqis monitored the radio messages to families in Kuwait and that members named in the message were tortured. She claimed that Iraqis tortured children caught giving food to Kuwaiti families. (DOS)
1 November 1990	A man claiming to be a Kuwaiti resistance member alleged that prisoners in an Iraqi prison were being tortured and killed. He claimed to have been raped by Iraqi soldiers and hung upside down for hours during interrogation. He also claimed that he and over 80 others had been held in a house in Basra, and fed only bread and water. Other torture methods included: pulling out finger-nails, chopping off pieces of fingers and hands, yanking out hair with pliers and burning with hot irons. (AP)

Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury

Report date	Incident
27 August 1990	An American citizen, who was taken into Iraqi custody in Kuwait, died of a heart attack (possibly stress-induced) on 27 August 1990, but the Iraqis did not release his body until 12 September 1990. (DOS)

Report date	Incident
5 September 1990	An American citizen in Kuwait was shot and seriously wounded in the arm. Following the shooting, he was taken into Iraqi custody, denied access to a United States consular officer, moved to Iraq and held hostage for two months, during which time medical complications arose. (DOS)
6 September 1990	Kuwait's Ambassador Mohammad Abulhasan stated that medical equipment, supplies and blood have been confiscated and shipped to Baghdad, causing the death of many patients who were receiving intensive care. All five Kuwaiti hospitals have been evacuated of their regular patients for use exclusively by Iraqi troops and citizens. (AP, DOS)
15 September 1990	Over 500 patients are known to have been turned out of two hospitals. Medical equipment confiscated includes such items as: kidney dialysis machines, incubators, surgical theatres, X-ray machines, laboratory equipment, laser equipment, furniture and medications. (DOS)
10 October 1990	Amnesty International has received several reports that women in Kuwait were raped by Iraqi soldiers. The victims include a British Airways stewardess and three Filipino women. (HRC)
12 October 1990	Residents of Kuwait have been evicted from homes, orphanages, mental institutions, hospitals and other institutions and their places given to Iraqi citizens. (Congress)
16 October 1990	Approximately 5,000 people arrived at the closed border between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran during a five-day period. They were detained for three days without shelter or water on the Iraq side. Three babies and one woman died from exposure. The Iraqi army turned away a water truck sent from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the end of five days the group was sent back to Kuwait. (Congress)
26 October 1990	United States Government sources stated that Kuwait would be without food by the end of October, and that until they exchanged their identification cards for Iraqi identification cards, Kuwaiti citizens would be refused such basic services as medical care. (DOS)

Unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected person

Report date	Incident
29 August 1990	Iraq transferred several hundred foreigners, mainly American, British, French and Japanese, from Kuwait to Iraq, where they are now being held under armed guard. (MEW)
29 August 1990	Six Kuwaiti nationals arrested by Iraqi forces on 3 August 1990 were taken to Baghdad where they are believed to be detained. (AI)
19 September 1990	Belgian Government sources state that they have received reports that Iraq is expelling Kuwaiti citizens from Kuwait and may be settling Palestinians in their places. (Reuter)
14 November 1990	After the 2 August 1990 invasion, about 200 American citizens were unlawfully transferred from Kuwait to Iraq. At this time some 100 remain held at strategic sites throughout Iraq. (DOS)

Unlawful confinement of a protected person

Report date	Incident
29 August 1990	The movements of most Western nationals in Kuwait were restricted by Iraq after the invasion. At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Western nationals numbered over 14,000. (MEW)
2 October 1990	Hundreds of Kuwaitis and other nationals are believed to be in detention centres or prisons in Kuwait and Iraq. (AI)
12 October 1990	Eight members of the Kuwait Red Crescent Society have been missing for four weeks. Three thousand Kuwaiti nationals have been taken by the Iraqi army but only 2,000 have had their whereabouts verified. (Congress)

Wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial

Report date	Incident
2 October 1990	According to Amnesty International, no one interviewed to date has reported that any legal proceedings have been followed by Iraqi authorities in the cases of detainees. (AI)
23 November 1990	Several entries reported earlier in the present report under other categories indicate circumstances where the right to a fair and regular trial has been denied. (DOS)

Taking of hostages

Report date	Incident
31 August 1990	Iraq announced after the invasion that foreign nationals were required to remain in Iraq to deter foreign aggression. (DOS)
5 October 1990	Sources report that Iraq has placed a bounty on all Westerners in Kuwait and that Iraqi troops are combing Kuwait City for them. (DOS)
10 October 1990	Several hundred Western nationals remain in detention in Baghdad and other locations in Iraq; others have been prevented from leaving Iraq or Kuwait. Schools, police stations, juvenile halls, and other public buildings in Kuwait are being used as detention and interrogation centres. (HRC)
5 November 1990	A letter from five British hostages held in a refinery that was published in the 4 November 1990 issue of the Sunday Times (London) described atrocious living conditions. Two men sleep over an open cesspit. Food is frequently inedible and food preparation areas are filthy and contaminated with flies and animal fecal matter. All five are ill with diarrhoea, chest problems and headaches from their proximity to the refinery's toxic waste burn-off towers. (DOS)
14 November 1990	Of the approximately 3,000 American citizens trapped in Iraq and Kuwait at the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, about 1,900 have been evacuated, while an undetermined number have fled overland. The Iraqi Government still holds approximately 100 American citizens at military, industrial, and scientific sites to deter foreign attacks on those targets. Others are trapped in the American Embassy in Baghdad, unable to leave Iraq. (DOS)

Extensive destruction and appropriation of property

Report date	Incident
19 August 1990	An American escapee from Kuwait informed United States Government officials of the widespread appropriation of luxury cars by Iraqis. (DOS)
21 August 1990	An American escapee from Kuwait reported to United States Government officials that arson was a sport for Iraqi soldiers. (DOS)

Report date	Incident
21 September 1990	A Canadian evacuee informed United States Government officials that Iraqi troops had torn out traffic lights and lamp-posts for shipment to Iraq. (DOS)
3 October 1990	The manager of Kuwait's Seven-Up bottling plant stated that all equipment had been confiscated and transported to Iraq. (DOS)
5 October 1990	United States Government sources report extensive looting of hospitals, mosques, schools, factories, port facilities, stores and private residences. (DOS)
8 October 1990	United States Government sources confirm that the comprehensive looting of Kuwait continues. Computers and generators have been removed from the Ministry of Public Works, produce and equipment have been taken from the Kuwait Flour Mill and newspapers have been stripped of printing presses. Traffic lights, telephone and power poles have been removed. (DOS)
16 October 1990	Eight schools, 7 homes, 51 businesses, 11 business complexes, 2 apartment buildings and 14 government buildings have been deliberately destroyed by arson. Others have been destroyed in bombings. (Congress)
16 October 1990	Fifteen Kuwait Airways aircraft, transformers, electrical supplies and equipment from the Ministry of Electricity and Water and hundreds of boats have been confiscated and shipped to Iraq. A shopping mall, shops and houses have been looted. (Congress)
18 October 1990	United States Government sources claim that the Iraqi Government and army personnel have confiscated all cars and trucks owned by Kuwaitis, expatriates and foreign firms. Included were 1,500 cars confiscated from the General Motors Company in Kuwait. In addition, soldiers are looting shops and homes. (DOS)
22 October 1990	A released American hostage informed United States Government officials that he had witnessed plundering of commercial establishments in Kuwait by Iraqi troops. He had also witnessed Iraqi troops load Kuwaiti police dogs and horses onto military vehicles which headed north towards Iraq. He stated that Iraqis had taken positions in his place of employment and, after having learned the operation of the factory, had dismantled it, carefully labelled all parts and removed all the equipment, furniture, air conditioners and company trucks. (DOS)

Report date	Incident
19 November 1990	Netherlands officials report that three of six boats used by a dredging company have been taken by the Iraqis. (DOS)

Notes

a/ Key to citation sources:

AFP	Agence France Presse, Paris
AP	Associated Press
AI	Amnesty International USA
Congress	Reports to United States Congress
DOS	Department of State reports
HRC	Reports to Congressional Human Rights Caucus
LAT	Los Angeles Times
MEW	Middle East Watch
Reuter	Reuter